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Executive Summary 
After four decades of astonishing economic growth China is now the second largest economy 
in the world, and it’s gaining also political and geographical importance in the globalized 
world. The country is no more, like it has been called, the factory of the world: its economy is 
undergoing a fundamental transition from one based mostly on the secondary sector to a more 
advanced one based on services and internal consumption. During this transition, which is far 
from being completed, China is suffering massive institutional volatility and social upheaval, 
and the government is struggling in the combined effort to avoid a further slowdown of 
economic growth, keep public and local debt under control and maintain employment rate 
stable. Nonetheless the increasing numbers of the middle-class and a booming consumption, 
as well as the centrality of the market as logistic hub, make China one of the most attractive 
countries for FDI.  Foreign investments reached indeed the record figure of USD 126.26 
billion in 2015 (Rossi & Fasulo, 2016).  
Despite the attractiveness, China has always had the reputation of a very complex market to 
approach. Even before the most recent development in its economy the country was 
considered to be a difficult market also among other emerging economies which are 
commonly thought to be in general more concerning for foreign companies because of the 
uncertainty of market conditions and the lack of well-formed institutions (Yildiz & Fey, 2012). 
Moreover the institutional uncertainty is only one side of the coin, since Chinese culture is 
very peculiar and entwined with business practices and whoever wants to operate in the 
market is forced to get in touch with the issue. All these factors brought together create a high 
level of Liability of Foreignness to which any foreign company is subject, and there are 
several cases of multinational firms that failed despite the size of their investment or their 
international experience and knowhow. 
The term was coined by Zaheer in 1995 as the set of difficulties and the related additional 
costs faced by companies in  foreign markets. He based her work on Hymer’s (1960) and 
Kindleberger’s (1969) studies on internationalization who first recognized the issue. The 
concept has been studied from several point of view in literature in order to understand both 
what are the causes and how to overcome its effects. For example according to who supports 
the RBV theory LOF can be overcome with organizational resources, while according to the 
institutional theory a company shall adapt to the environment to gain legitimacy and reduce 
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pressure from internal and external stakeholders. When it comes to operating in a foreign 
country the lack of knowledge about local practices, institutions and culture can give rise to a 
big disadvantage compared to domestic players, and it’s important to understand the market 
and implement suitable strategies to mitigate LOF. In any case though there is no definitive 
theory that can describe the concept. It would be impossible to define a single framework to 
analyze the wide variety of different situations where LOF is involved, and there is no recipe 
to follow to overcome it. Nonetheless it’s possible to narrow down our focus to one part of the 
phenomenon where the effect of LOF can be stronger, in developing and emerging economies, 
and eventually to China.  
The main difference of operating in emerging markets compared to industrialized ones is the 
transitional nature of their industrial and institutional environments, which brings enormous 
opportunities for foreign firms but also high instability and operational uncertainty (Luo et Al. 
2002). China in particular presents a very complex environment for foreign companies which 
are required to understand it and of course to implement suitable strategies to cope with the 
consequent high LOF. Chinese culture permeate its business environment, where the direct 
reflection is the importance of personal connection (Guanxi) in every aspect of the market, 
from the relationship with suppliers and clients to the one with government officials. 
Moreover like in other developing economies the lack of well-established institutions and the 
uncertainty of laws enforcement increase the volatility and related risks. If we add the 
widespread corruption and slow bureaucracy it’s clear that approaching this market 
unprepared could be fatal for the success of any enterprise. 
The list of problems that can be encountered and their effect on the level of Liability of 
Foreignness perceived by companies can vary widely not only between different countries, 
but also among different groups of – or even single – enterprises. In China for example the 
level of protectionism experienced can vary between industries, in relation to the level of 
restrictions that the government implemented (Rossi and Fasulo, 2016). Or for instance the 
level of integration with the environment chosen for the subsidiary can influence the degree of 
local adaptation and consequently the pressure from different stakeholders, and more in 
general the cultural distance (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983). I conducted therefore an empirical 
analysis on data retrieved directly from foreign firms in China to analyze the high variety of 
drivers of LOF and the way their effect is related to a company situation. One should be 
aware that these results are not definitive, since the small number of answers that was possible 
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to collect hampers the ability of the sample to fully represent the population. My findings 
suggest that the perceived LOF is the result of multiple drivers, which affect independently 
and differently firm’s performance. Moreover it appears like the effect of drivers depends also 
on other variables like the years of activity in China, the type of legal entity chosen, the 
industry, the country of origin and previous export experience in the country.  
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Chapter 1: The Chinese market and its complexity 
Introduction 
In this first chapter I am going to describe what the main characteristics of the Chinese market 
are and how it evolved in the last four decades, to become the second largest economy in the 
world. Despite the astonishing economic growth, which has marked its recent history, China 
is not, and has never been, an easy market to access and succeed in, due to many institutional 
and cultural aspects. This is why many companies who enter the market find difficult to thrive 
and often have to give up. Moreover it’s not only a matter of available resources, in fact also 
big corporations sometimes can’t find the key to success in this unique environment. I took a 
few examples of these failures and found some common factors that pushed these companies 
to eventually leave.    
Overview of the Chinese market 
The Chinese economy has been growing at a whopping average annual rate of 9.82% from 
1989 to 2016 according to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, bringing the country to 
be the second biggest economy and the second biggest consumer market in world, after the 
US. In the last couple of years  though, due to the reduction of worldwide demand for raw 
materials and consequent fall of prices of commodities,  the growth rate  has slowed down to 
6.7% in the 1st and 2nd  quarters 2016, the slowest growth since the first quarter of 2009 
(Husna, 2016) - right after the global financial crisis. Figure 1 shows the annual GDP growth 
rate in the past 25 years.  
The booming growth in the past 30 years was mostly driven by the industrial sector, as China 
was becoming the so called “factory of the world”, and huge investments in infrastructure and 
housing, sometimes redundant, in order to support the incredible expansion of cities around 
the country. Moreover Chinese GDP benefitted from an unprecedented stream of foreign 
direct investments that fueled even more the already sustained growth. Still nowadays the 
secondary sector is a major component of total GDP, and it was only last year, in 2015, that 
tertiary sector surpassed 50% of the total (Rossi & Fasulo, 2016), as shown in figure 2. If we 
compare these figures with those of developed economies like the U.S. or even Italy, where 
the tertiary sector made in 2014 up to 78% and 74.3% of the economy respectively 
(worldbank.org), we can see how China has still some road ahead.  
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Figure 1 – China GDP Annual Growth Rate ( 1990 – 2015) 
 
Source: www.tradingeconomics.com | National Bureau of Statistics of China 
 
Figure 2 - Services value added in China in the last 25 years (% of GDP) 
 
Source: data.worldbank.org | World Development Indicators 
The recent slowdown has exposed all the flaws characterizing Chinese economy. The 
industrial and mining sectors have suffered everywhere in the world from the struggling 
economy, but in China where they both are heavily made of state owned enterprises (SOE) - 
in which inefficiency and overcapacity flourished due to double-digits growth rates and local 
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governments’ incentives – these industries have been struggling and have survived only 
thanks huge amount of debt, which is according to a new Moody’s report up to 115% of 
China GDP (Desai, 2016), and state protectionism, giving origin to many so-called “zombie 
companies”, running only to pay off debt. If Chinese economy is still growing it is because 
other sectors, as shown in figure 3, are thriving thanks to their competiveness and modern 
business models based more on value creation than on state intervention. 
Figure 3 - Profit in selected sectors of Chinese economy, Growth in 2015 
 
Source: Rossi & Fasulo, 2016 | Wind Information 
The Chinese government has understood that the situation is concerning and that it’s 
necessary to adapt to the “new normal” of slower growth and has undertaken the goal of 
transforming the economy into a fully developed one based on sustainable growth, internal 
consumption and services. At the same time they are committed to address the structural 
problems of the secondary sector transitioning to a more modern one based on technology and 
efficiency and less on state intervention to compete (Rossi & Fasulo, 2016).  The undergoing 
transitioning process is very complex and the political and economic agenda of the 
government has to take into consideration many stakeholders in order to bring the country as 
smoothly as possible to a new equilibrium. This is especially true in a huge country like China, 
characterized by very diverse regions, each with its own local interests, and a culture driven 
by compromise in all of its aspects. Also investors understood that China is now in a critical 
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phase of its development and the high volatility of markets, especially in summer 2015 and 
January 2016, is an indicator of their worries.   
Nonetheless Chinese president Xi Jinping is committed to make sure that the government’s 
objective of doubling the 2010 GDP level by 2020 is matched. To do so consumption and 
services must secure their predominance as share of national economy, in order to offset the 
slower growth in the secondary sector and keep the annual growth rate at the current levels for 
the next five years. Furthermore the government is sponsoring a development plan for 
economic integration that should reach not only neighboring countries, but also Central Asia 
and eventually Europe, called “One Belt, One Road” and inspired to the Silk Road experience 
in ancient times. The project includes impressive infrastructural works that should help 
Chinese economy to better integrate with others and reduce the overcapacity structural 
problems it is facing. The project will be also financed by the newly founded Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), wanted by the Chinese government but co-founded by 
various nations from the whole world, to “address the daunting infrastructure needs in Asia” 
(Source: www.aiib.org).  
Figure 4 – Foreign Direct Investment in China. USD hundreds of millions. (1997 – 2015) 
 
Source: www.tradingeconomics.com | Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of 
China 
China has seen the level of foreign direct investments increase at an incredible pace in the 
past 20 years and despite the slugging economy and the rising difficulties of operating in the 
market in most recent years, in 2015 was recorded the maximum total amount ever invested in 
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Chinese history, USD 126.26 billion (Rossi & Fasulo, 2016) as shown in figure 4, which 
represents the cumulative foreign direct investment in every single year since 1997. 
Consistently with the new direction taken by Chinese economic development, also the nature 
of foreign investments is transforming: compared to 2006, when the share of investments in 
manufacturing sector was 63.6% vs a 31.1% in services, the situation has basically inverted, 
with 70.4% in the service sector and 28.3% in manufacturing during the first six month of 
2016 (Trading Economics). 
Even though the amount of FDI is still increasing, it’s undeniable that the pace has 
decelerated in last few years. This slowing down is certainly due to the overall decrease of 
Chinese economic growth, but also from a growing protectionist attitude of the government 
(Rossi & Fasulo, 2016). Even if on one side China has decreased monetary trade barriers in 
the years, as part of its commitment to open the economy after entering in the WTO, on the 
other side the non-monetary barrier have increased considerably. In particular several foreign 
multinationals have been put under pressure by local and national authorities with 
investigations and fines in the frame of the new antitrust law implemented in 2008. Also in 
the field of trademark and license protection, not only Chinese law are pretty loose, they are 
also poorly enforced, especially when it comes to foreign brands. A clamorous example is 
Apple, who recently lost a trademark lawsuit over the use of the name “IPHONE” on leather 
products against the Chinese company Xintong Tiandi, who apparently filed their trademark 
application in 2007 when, according to the court, Apple could not prove it was a well-known 
brand in China, even though the US based multinational filed the brand for electronic goods 
back in 2002 (source: www.BBC.com).  
But the battle against foreign companies is not fought only in courts, there are many other 
kind of non-tariff barriers both on the demand side, with control of market through public 
auctions which consistently favor local companies in their requirements, and on the offer side 
with limitations to investments in strategic sectors, stricter controls on operations of foreign 
invested companies. Also the access to credit is of course easier for local SOEs – and this is 
one of the main reason for the huge debt problem that China is facing. It appears that many 
companies and institutions in the country perceive local players to have acquired enough 
managerial maturity and capabilities in order to prosper without the help of foreign 
investments. This sentiment is also bringing along a rising nationalism in the whole country. 
Therefore, after a period of warm welcome to foreign companies with several incentives to 
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FDI in order to boost the economic growth, Chinese government has now changed its strategy 
in order to ensure that young national firms thrive to the detriment of foreign ones, especially 
in key sectors like automotive, telecommunications, iron and steel, financial, petrochemical 
and agricultural. 
The institutional pressure on foreign firms is then now at the highest level since the opening 
of Chinese market to the world and companies who want to invest and succeed must 
proactively seek for good relationships with all the stakeholder now more than ever (Rossi & 
Fasulo, 2016). The need for a wide and deep network of relationship in China is not a new 
thing though, in fact the Chinese value of “Guanxi” – relationship in mandarin – is a pillar of 
Chinese culture and dominate all aspects of life, including business. Guanxi represents not 
only a good relationship, it stands for a strong tie with the other party and mutual trust built on 
exchange of favors, and cannot be ignored by foreign companies that need to consolidate their 
relationship with government officers, as well as with suppliers and distributors. Failure to do 
so can make company’s life more difficult, to the point of hampering its results.  
Regardless the increasing difficulties, investments in china have always being “high risks – 
high returns” ones, especially now that the economy is in a transitioning phase the risk can be 
extremely high. Nonetheless returns and risks can vary among different industries: 
technologically advanced industry, retail and service sectors that are now driving, and will 
drive in the coming years, Chinese economy are still in a development stage and still offer 
growth opportunities, even though international and local competition is fiercer and fiercer. 
Investments aimed to exploit lower labor costs and looser regulations are will face rising 
difficulties and are maybe not worth anymore. Also the choice of localization is very 
important, since China is not a single market and different regions within have both different 
growth rates and market maturity levels, giving opportunities to different players. 
It’s no surprise that many foreign companies have tried to take a share of the booming 
economic growth in the past 30 years. The results, however, have not always been successful, 
even if we don’t consider the last period. In fact many companies who attempted to enter the 
Chinese market, even among those who did it in the golden age of FDI inflow in China and 
could benefit of important incentives from local and national authorities, didn’t experience 
great success, and in some cases the output was a disaster. Despite several stories of success, a 
number of multinational corporations have experienced crushing failures. In the next section, 
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we analyze a select few of these cases, bringing together common factors that led to their 
subsequent failure.  
Case studies 
Best Buy 
Best Buy is one of the largest US consumer electronics retailers by revenues (statista.com) 
and since its creation has been focusing on a price competitive strategy, surviving more than 
one price war throughout its existence. With the arrival of online retailers however, the 
company has been facing a lot of pressure, due to its cost disadvantages compared to the main 
online competitors, Amazon.com above all (Pernet & Nunez-Candiani, 2012). Best Buy found 
itself reevaluating its own competitive advantage in the US. The company realized that the 
only way to maintain its market share, and eventually avoid bankruptcy was to re-focus on 
what online retailers cannot provide, a consumer-centric strategy. Nowadays Best Buy 
provides additional warranties and in-home installation and configuration, together with 
knowledgeable employees’ assistance. Nevertheless this strategy is having a drawback effect, 
since is helping Amazon in increasing its sales, as Best Buy’s store are becoming Amazon’s 
showrooms. It’s very common for clients to go checking products before buying them online 
for a cheaper price. With these threats in the domestic market, Best Buy have decided to 
increase its efforts in foreign markets. 
Due to its economic and social factors, China represented a very good opportunity for the 
company’s growth in foreign markets; moreover they had already operated in China for 
purchasing purposes, so the market was not completely unknown. In 2006 Best Buy acquired 
China’s third largest electronics retailers, Five Star. With this acquisition the company 
obtained immediate retail presence in the market and a strong management team familiar with 
local consumers. By 2011 they were operating 164 Five Star stores in the whole China and 8 
Best Buy branded stores in Shanghai. Best Buy branded stores in China were organized and 
managed in a very similar way to US stores; sales persons were qualified and were not biased 
by commissions, as in the majority of Chinese retailers’ stores. Their differentiation strategy 
relied, as in the US, on services like installation, repair work and guarantees: a level of service 
that you can hardly find in Chinese market. 
One big problem though was the lack of brand recognition, and they had to invest a lot in 
marketing to reduce this disadvantage. They also invested in some large flagship store in the 
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city center. The settlement in Shanghai downtown, and not in the suburbs like in US, was led 
by the fact that most of its competitors were located in the same area. The company made a 
mistake with the choice of stores’ location though: some of them for example were located far 
from metro stations, making them not conveniently reachable. Despite huge investments, Best 
Buy operations in China haven’t been profitable, and although they cut their expenses along 
in the years, by the end of 2011 all their 8 branded stores were closed. 
Chinese electronic retailers have a completely different strategy from their US equivalents. 
They manage to be incredibly price competitive by renting partially or entirely their store 
space to manufacturers and passing costs directly to them. Such a strategy consequently is 
highly dependent on a commission-based model, which bring higher sales per employee. In 
addition to Best Buy’s cost disadvantage, the company also suffered from lower returns per 
employee. It’s easy to understand how Best Buy’s business model was not as profitable as 
they had expected. Furthermore, Chinese consumers perceived Best Buy’s prices to be higher 
than its local competitors, even if prices were quite similar. The origin of this was partially 
due to the fact that Chinese people perceive foreign brands as more expensive, but also on the 
company’s business model itself. Their non-commission based strategy resulted in a fixed 
price policy, which was in contrast not only with their main competitors’ strategy (which 
allow sales persons to apply discounts), but also with the Chinese practice of negotiating 
prices. This is so embedded in Chinese culture that sometimes a product is more likely to be 
purchased if a deeper discount is applied, even if the final price is higher or equivalent. 
Moreover, not only were Best Buy’s prices perceived to be higher, but their value proposition 
was not perceived to be better than Chinese competitors. Local players in fact do not usually 
provide additional services because consumers can buy the same services in small 
convenience store for a better price. Even if the company’s differentiation strategy is valued 
by American customers, the same is not true for Chinese ones. Best Buy found itself without 
any competitive advantage and facing several disadvantages toward Chinese players. “Best 
Buy represented the shopping, not purchasing, stage of consumption,” sums up consumer 
researcher Mary Bergstrom (Young, 2011). 
Home depot 
China’s homeownership has been growing with incredible pace in the last decade, and with a 
growing middle class, the homeownership is expected to increase in the next few years, 
despite the economic slowdown. Moreover Chinese culture is embedded in what we can 
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define as “everyday ingenuity and thrift” (Carlson, 2013). In this context looks like Home 
Depot, America’s largest home improvement company and leader in the DIY market, would 
thrive. Instead, after having entered the market in 2006 with the acquisition of a local firm, the 
company was forced to retreat after seven years of struggle. 
There are different reasons why this happened. One reason is the labor cost in the country. 
Often in China it is more convenient to hire a handyman to accomplish the job, instead of 
doing-it-yourself, especially if you are a new member of the middle-class and you want to 
demonstrate your recently achieved economic condition. A second reason is the nature of 
housing market in China: especially in big cities where prices are booming, people buy houses 
more as an investment than to live in, and thus have few reasons to improve them. Moreover 
“Chinese consumers have no role model from older generations” (Wang, 2011). 
Homeownership was almost non-existent in China about 20 years ago, so the practice of home 
improvement is relatively new.  Home Depot’s business model is to provide tools and 
consultations for customers, providing them with the means to complete their home 
improvement projects. This strategy is based on the assumption that customers have their own 
projects—an assumption that does not necessarily hold for people in China.  
That’s why IKEA, the Swedish furniture giant, on the contrary is growing very fast in China, 
riding the market’s incredible boom. “Their Western-style showrooms provide model 
bedrooms, dining rooms, and family rooms showing how to furnish them” (Bhasin, 2012), 
and allow Chinese consumers to experience and purchase a western life-style,  which is 
exactly what Chinese people are looking for in such a store. 
E-bay 
E-bay (China) was one of the first companies to enter into the Chinese C2C online market, 
and given the international experience of the company, which had already successfully 
operated in several foreign markets, it was expected to succeed in China. Their main 
competitor, who entered the market later, was a local company owned by the e-commerce 
giant Alibaba and ended up being market leader TaoBao nowadays. E-bay instead quit and 
left the Chinese market by the end of 2006.  
The competitive disadvantage between E-bay and TaoBao was not in the US company 
business model, which was eventually copied by the latter: it was in the website’s 
functionalities available for users. E-bay in fact didn’t provide as TaoBao any embedded 
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instant messaging platform in their website that allow consumers to see if a seller is online 
and immediately communicate with them. This feature is very important for Chinese 
consumers, which value the possibility to directly contact sellers in order to establish a trust 
relationship with them before buying anything. This is due to two main factors: the first is the 
diffusion of counterfeit products and fraud, together with “the lack of a well-established legal 
infrastructure to protect online transactions” (Ou & Davison, 2009). The second is the 
widespread culture of Guanxi in the Chinese market. Guanxi as mentioned before represents 
the mechanism of social connections in Chinese culture; it could be compared to what a 
business network represents in the western culture, with the difference that it’s not only 
related to business. The possibility to establish a direct connection with the seller, before 
making a final purchase online, was an important driver in TaoBao’s success. 
Moreover E-bay (China) was managed by foreign managers who didn’t know the local market 
and who invested a lot of money in the wrong way. For instance, after they entered the market 
the US Company started an aggressive advertising campaign on online major portals. 
TaoBao’s answer was a massive TV ads campaign: Jack Ma, founder of Alibaba, knew that 
more Chinese small business owners were more likely to watch TV rather than surfing the 
internet (Wang, 2010). E-Bay (China) lost its fight against TaoBao because it was more 
product-centric than customer-centric, and eventually the Chinese company attracted all E-
Bay’s unsatisfied customers with a better value proposition. According to a Beijing-based 
commentator “The road to Internet riches in China is paved with corpses of American giants, 
and the body count continues to grow” (Ou & Davison, 2009). 
Common factors in the three analyzed case studies 
If we look at the mentioned cases, even if every company had its own experience, we can 
track down some common factors. Let’s first review what have been the main problems that 
each company faced: 
• Best Buy offered to Chinese consumers the same value proposition they were offering 
in the US, to realize that Chinese people were not valuating it enough to pay the higher 
prices the American company was charging for (even if listed prices were almost the 
same, Best Buy’s were not negotiable). 
• Home Depot wanted to provide the same product with the same format they were 
providing in their home market, without understanding that Chinese consumers, 
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despite the fact that getting by is part of their culture, were not looking for this kind of 
offer, whether because there were no interest in improving or because there was no 
history of household improvement in the country. 
• Although E-Bay was the first entrant in the Chinese C2C market, they were caught in 
fierce competition with a local player. TaoBao at that time could not be compared in 
term of size and financial resources, but they understood better what Chinese 
consumers needed. The US giant instead kept using their standardized global website 
without adapting it to the local market, and invested its larger resources in the wrong 
way. 
As stated by Carlson (2013, p.1) “While the causes are as varied as the industries themselves, 
a pattern can be discerned among the biggest failures in China: an inability to grasp just how 
different — and cutthroat — the Chinese market can be.” These companies, and many others 
like them, entered the Chinese market with the assumption that consumers would behave in 
the same way as they do in their home market. In other words, they didn’t know or they didn’t 
understand the market they were entering into and therefore they couldn’t recognize the 
correct strategy to adopt in order to achieve positive results. This inability to grasp the key 
driver of success in the market is a big disadvantage towards local players, which in contrast 
know very well the market and its mechanisms. 
Conclusion  
In literature the disadvantage suffered by foreign companies who operates in the market is 
referred to as Liability of Foreignness (Zaheer, 1995) and four categories of costs can be 
framed in the concept: 1) costs directly associated with spatial distance, such as the costs of 
travel, transportation, and coordination over distance and across time zones; 2) firm-specific 
costs based on a particular company's unfamiliarity with and lack of roots in a local 
environment; 3) costs resulting from the host country environment, such as the lack of 
legitimacy of foreign firms and economic nationalism; and 4) costs from the home country 
environment, such as the restrictions on high-technology sales to certain countries imposed on 
US-owned MNEs. While this list is not exhaustive, it identifies key sources of additional costs 
facing foreign organizations operating abroad (Moeller et Al., 2013).  We will now see how 
the definition evolved in time, from when it was first coined to the most modern theorizations 
and interpretations.   
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Chapter 2: Liability of Foreignness in literature  
Introduction  
Even though the term liability of foreignness (LOF) was coined by Zaheer only in 1995,  his 
work is largely based on Hymer’s (1960) and Kindleberger’s (1969) studies on 
internationalization of firms in the sixties who “recognized that transaction costs are greater 
for foreign firms than for their domestic counterparts because of their foreignness” (Luo & 
Mezias, 2002, p.218). In this chapter, I review the core theories that stem from Hymer’s work 
on LOF: the concept has been studied from several point of view and while there is no 
definitive theory to describe the phenomenon, it is interesting to nevertheless mention and 
review the most common points of view that appear in the literature. 
Hymer and the cost of doing business abroad 
As mentioned, the first who wrote about disadvantages for foreign companies in competing 
with local firms was Hymer (1960), who defined them the costs of doing business abroad. He 
was convinced that one factor influencing internationalization is the existence of entry 
barriers, intended as disadvantages towards native companies. These disadvantages, according 
to Hymer (1960), are due to both foreign exchange risks and lack of knowledge of the most 
common business practices and market conditions.  As stated by the author, “National firms 
have the general advantage of better information about their country” (p. 34), and these 
information could be very expensive to acquire for a foreign company. It is also true that this 
cost can be considered a fixed one, therefore once paid, the disadvantage should be countered.  
This is not the only disadvantage faced by foreign firms though. Hymer (1960) himself says 
that much more relevant —and permanent— is the discrimination a foreign company face, 
“by government, by consumers, and by suppliers”. Sometimes this discrimination is voluntary, 
like in case of custom duties, some other times is not, for example the preference for local 
brands by consumers. In any case these disadvantages are difficult to measure precisely, and 
sometimes also to identify, even if they are extremely relevant.  
Offsetting LOF with corporate capabilities 
Kindleberger (1969) was convinced that if the world was characterized by perfect competition, 
foreign direct investment would no longer exist: if markets work effectively and there are no 
barriers in terms of trade or competition, firms would have no incentive to invest abroad. Not 
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only foreign firms must have certain advantages that give them incentive to invest, but also 
the market of these benefits has to be imperfect (Denisia, 2010). Many authors who worked 
on the liability of foreignness focused in fact on finding what advantages are more effective to 
overcome it. Among the earliest studies those of Caves (1971) and Buckley and Casson (1976) 
tried to find these solutions identifying the strategic advantage in intangible assets. Buckley 
and Casson (2009) underlined how internationalization activities were concentrated mostly in 
“knowledge-intensive industries, characterized by high levels of research and development 
(R&D) expenditure and advertising expenditure, and by the employment of skilled 
labor”(p.1564), explaining how managerial skills and coordination are necessary for a 
company to enter in foreign markets, especially if very different and distant.  
Caves (1971) maintained instead that a company is willing to invest abroad only if it’s in 
possess of some unique assets, which must necessarily satisfy two conditions: they must be 
commonly available among the company and “the return attainable on a firm’s special asset in 
a foreign market must depend at least somewhat on local production” (Caves, 1971, p.5). 
According to the author, knowledge as a core competence is a perfect example of this kind of 
assets. Knowledge is embodied in company’s culture and is supposed to be widely available 
among the company. Moreover it can be transferred, even if not always entirely or with the 
same effect, also to other markets in which a firm intend to invest. Knowledge transferability 
is not enough though, because local enterprises also have their own knowledge, and it’s 
specifically focused on the local market. This is why the information advantage is not enough 
for a firm to invest in the market: the advantage have to be at least partially dependent on 
local production. 
According to Caves (1971) product differentiation can be identified as the form of “rent-
yielding knowledge” that best represent the need of local production in order to offset liability 
of foreignness. First of all we can recognize how differentiation respect the first condition, 
because it’s a product characteristic very clear not only among the company, but also among 
stakeholders; in fact sometimes is really part of the company’s image. It is also easily 
transferable to other markets at a minimum cost. This advantage also depends on local 
production to be effective, as historical evidence shows that firms generally first test a market 
with export and then switch to local production “for better adaptation of the product to the 
local market or the superior quality (or lower cost) of ancillary service that can be provided” 
(Caves, 1971, p.7).  
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The Resource Based View 
Caves studies can be easily framed in a larger stream of research taking inspiration from 
Barney’s (1991) Resource Based View (RBV) theory, according to which competitive 
advantage is founded on firm’s resources and capabilities. The RBV follows two assumptions: 
first, companies may have a different set of resources, and their advantage can be built on 
some unique ones; second, resources shall be at least partially immobile, allowing companies 
to have sustainable competitive advantage based on those resources (Barney, 1991). Firm-
specific advantages can help a foreign company to overcome liability of foreignness (Denk et 
Al., 2012) especially, as suggested by Zaheer’s findings, when a firm’s competitive advantage 
reside in its organizational capabilities: for foreign subsidiaries “imported organizational 
practices may be a more effective way […] to overcome the liability of foreignness than 
imitation of local practices” (p. 360) that are not part of parent’s expertise. Cuervo-Cazurra et 
al. (2007) indeed found that internationalization costs are higher if (1) resources that generate 
firm-specific advantages cannot be transferred abroad, (2) firm-specific resources in the home 
country turn out to be disadvantages in the host country, or (3) the firm lacks complementary 
resources required to successfully operate in the host market. 
According to some authors, large MNEs importing their capabilities to the subsidiaries not 
only can manage to overcome liability of foreignness, but also to have competitive advantage 
over local firms, thanks to their global network and expertise that smaller native companies 
don’t have. Hymer (1960) himself considered this possibility. Starting from the contrast 
between these results and many other findings that show instead how foreign companies 
suffer from liability of foreignness, Nachum (2003) argued that the firm performance in a 
foreign market is the balance between the disadvantages of being foreign and the superior 
advantages of MNEs. His study revealed that liability of foreignness doesn’t always results in 
low performance. “Under certain circumstances the superior advantages of MNEs outweigh 
the additional costs associated with foreign activity, leading to superior performance of MNEs.   
Barnard (2010) argued instead that sometimes firm-specific capabilities are not appropriate or 
not enough developed to overcome liability of foreignness in a specific host market. This is 
the case for example of multinationals from developing countries that try to enter in more 
developed markets; these companies, due to their development in less regulated market, 
where usually competition is weaker, would need to overcome both liability of foreignness 
and a generally weaker capability base. Barnard (2010) maintains that resources available in 
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the market are an effective way - even if not optimal - to overcome both the disadvantages. 
Specifically she mentioned local workforce and local suppliers can provide the lacking 
competencies. It’s worth to notice that neither of these two resources are purely market-based, 
and even if they start as contractual relationships, they are likely to become with time more 
relational. “The hybrid transactional/relational nature of these relationships is probably a key 
reason why they are so effective” (Barnard, 2010, p.169). 
Institutional theories: adapting to the local environment  
While liability of foreignness was initially closely related to, if not completely synonymous 
with, the costs of doing business abroad, Zaheer (2002) finds a distinction between the two 
concepts. Costs of doing business abroad, as defined by Hymer (1960), are basically a set of 
market-driven costs; Zaheer (2002) instead focused on the more suitable structural/relational 
and institutional costs of doing business. Structural/relational costs are associated with a 
foreign firm’s network position in the host country and its linkages to important local actors, 
while institutional costs affect the legitimacy of the foreign firm, as well as the extent of local 
learning the company needs to engage in (Zaheer, 2002; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). A 
distinction is also remarked by Sethi and Judge (2009), who argued that costs of doing 
business abroad include all the costs of cross-border operations at the subsidiary-level, of 
which liability of foreignness is just one component. 
Institutions had already been recognized as drivers of LOF by Kindleberger (1969) who 
highlighted how, even if “the relationship of governments to the international corporation is 
asymmetrical” (p.193), both the home country and the host country can make pressures on the 
international company. As the home country will try to influence company behavior abroad 
through the parent in its own country, the host country has many instruments to exert pressure 
on the corporation through the subsidiary. We can assume that the host country is more likely 
to take actions that, if possible, give advantage to local firms instead of foreign firms.  
Vernon (1977) recognized the stigma of being foreigner in a growing local bias against 
foreign firms representing a specific disadvantage facing companies operating in a foreign 
market and attributed the local bias to host governments and domestic firms viewing powerful 
multinational corporations as threats to their countries’ technological and industrial 
development. Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997) suggested that liability of foreignness is a form 
of public stigmatization and is a function of social and cultural barriers. This view is shared 
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by Eden and Miller (2004), who identified one of three categories of liability of foreignness as 
discrimination hazard, originated by unfavorable treatment from local institutions and 
stakeholders in general. Moreover the costs resulting from discriminatory behavior from local 
stakeholders - unlike the unfamiliarity with local business practices (Petersen & Pedersen, 
2002) - are not likely to decrease with elapsed time.  
Taking inspiration from Vernon (1977), Zaheer (1995) and Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997) 
focused on MNEs operating in highly developed economies with powerful institutional 
environments (Luo and Mezias, 2002). These studies argued that foreign firms could 
experience liability of foreignness if they wouldn’t understand or follow local institutional 
norms. In fact, even if laws express somehow the differences in cultures between the foreign 
firm and the local environment, they are equally available and clearly stated for both native 
and foreign companies. The greatest degree in information asymmetry then resides in non-
written rules, or norms (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999), also defined as the rules of the game by 
North (1990). Norms are embedded in the local culture and, even if foreign investors try to 
adapt their strategy and operations in order to conform to them and gain legitimacy among 
local stakeholders (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983), often the country-specific nature of them 
makes it difficult to fully understand and implement accepted organizational practices. Failing 
to implement socially accepted practices can drive friction between the organization and local 
stakeholders and possibly trigger penalizing actions from powerful institutions; tensions with 
the business environment and coercive actions from local institutions can generate liability of 
foreignness. Calhoum (2002) suggests that different level of corruption might be an example 
of unwritten rules; a firm based in a country with low level of corruption for instance is likely 
to be disadvantaged by the lack of complete understanding of this relevant phenomenon.  
Also Elango (2009) analyzed foreign firms behavior in a highly regulated market and their 
use of boundary spanning; the term is described as ‘‘...those roles that involve procuring 
resources and disposing of outputs, relating the organization to its larger community, and 
adapting the organization to the future by gathering information about trends ...’’ (Scott, 
Mitchell, & Birnbarum, 1981, p.244). Elango (2009) maintains that companies can reduce the 
effects of liability of foreignness by effectively processing information acquired from the 
environment and then transmitting back to the local stakeholders the right favorable 
information about the firm. According to him the ability to handle these two tasks increases 
company’s chances of survival in the foreign market. Elango’s (2009) study shows that 
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operating with a wider product range, to gain exposure and increase the chances to meet local 
tastes, and the affiliation with business groups to share resources and tap knowledge are 
effective strategies to minimize the effects of liability of foreignness. 
Cultural theories  
We can notice how institutional theories are often connected to cultural differences. The 
capability to understand local norms depends mostly on the knowledge about local cultural 
environment. Zaheer (2002) even argues that cultural distance is a concept that can be 
included in the broader framework of institutional distance. According to Calhoum (2002) 
foreign firms are subject to 2 kind of uncertainty when entering the market, external 
uncertainty, streaming from a different set of stakeholders who do not share the same cultural 
background, and internal uncertainty due to local staff values that are not necessarily in line 
with company practices. According to Eden and Miller (2004) internal and external 
uncertainty are part of the same category of liability of foreignness, that they call relational 
hazard. Moeller et Al. (2013) instead went even further, distinguishing between tangible and 
intangible, for both internal and external factors. While external uncertainty can be framed 
into institutional theories, internal should be encapsulated into cultural distance theory.  
Foreign ventures face a big disadvantage compared to native firms when trying to manage 
their local hired employees. The formers in fact struggle between the required internal 
consistency with parent’s organizational practices and the need to local adaptation (Bartlett & 
Ghoshal, 1989). Moreover staff may be unwilling to undergo corporate norms and practices, 
and could question or sometimes challenge management decisions (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). 
Even when staff agree to adopt organizational values the unfamiliarity with local employees’ 
culture can decrease management’s ability to lead them and to obtain their best performance, 
as found out by Newman and Nollen (1996): using Hofstede’s (1980) dimensions of national 
culture, they studied how a greater fit between practices used at the organizational level and 
national culture can be associated with higher performance of the subsidiary. Their results 
support the notion that national culture seems to mediate the effectiveness of work practices at 
the organizational level. Nationality, and its culture together, could be a driver of liability of 
foreignness itself (Moeller et Al., 2013): country of origin could influence consumers’ 
response to firms’ products or brand and can have a significant impact on quality perception. 
The country of origin though could be a misleading variable and must be taken into 
consideration carefully due to what Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) defined administrative 
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heritage, or the homogeneity of organizational practices among companies from the same 
country. This heritage may differ between different countries, and additional costs for foreign 
enterprises could be due to these practices and not from foreignness.  
Also Kogut and Singh (1988) used Hofstede’s model as a basis for their studies. They used 
for the first time the concept of cultural distance to measure organizational performance, 
arguing that rising managing costs faced by the corporation are associated with the increase of 
cultural distance between the country of origin and the country where the subsidiary is set up. 
Other studies later argued that Schwartz’s model (1994) is more suitable than Hofstede’s, 
because more complete. Nonetheless more recently Mezias et al. (2002) showed that the use 
of these two models of national culture to characterize phenomena at organizational level is 
biased and results in systematic errors. And actually not only Kogut and Singh (1988), but 
Hofstede (1980) himself stated that the use of national culture dimensions is not ideal to be 
applied to organizational studies, and a measure of cultural characteristic at corporate level 
would be more suitable.  
Internationalization process theories  
Given the important effect that cultural and institutional distance have on a company 
operations in a foreign market recent studies have focused on strategies aimed to increase the 
corporate knowledge about the host market. Petersen and Pedersen (2002) developed a 
conceptual model to study how the learning engagement affects the liability of foreignness 
with the goal to identify the best solution to reduce it. Taking inspiration from Zaheer and 
Mosakowski (1997) who first suggested that liability of foreignness is likely to diminish with 
elapsed time, Petersen and Pedersen state that the learning engagement is influenced by two 
variables: the elapsed time and the perceived familiarity of the entrant firm - and its 
management – with the foreign market. The learning engagement has been defined by the two 
authors as the way managers decide to tackle the lack of knowledge about the new market. 
How do the two mentioned variables affect the learning effort? First, the effort itself is only 
triggered by the perceived unfamiliarity with the market; second, the period over which the 
effort is spent – the elapsed time – is likely to affect the quality of this engagement. It is 
important to notice how according to Petersen and Pedersen (2002) time itself is not enough 
to bring knowledge to the firm. If the company perform no activity in the foreign market, or if 
it is not open to change – and learning – the effect of engagement would be close to zero. 
Management can therefore choose among three different strategies of learning engagement: 
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sometimes managers can perceive the foreign market similar to their home market, or the 
company’s global strategy do not need local adaptation; in this first scenario the firm will not 
engage in any learning. If instead a learning strategy is needed, management can decide for a 
pre-entry learning or for a post-entry learning strategy. Of course in the first case the 
familiarity with the local market will be higher from the beginning. On the other hand if a 
post-entry learning has been chosen, the familiarity will be low right after the market entry, 
but is likely to increase with elapsed time (Figure 5).  
Figure 5 – Learning Engagement Strategies 
 
Source: Petersen & Pedersen (2002) 
In any case foreign firms are likely to become more and more integrated with the local 
environment with elapsed time after they have entered the market, and this remain true despite 
the introduction of the newest technologies: Nachum and Zaheer (2005) find that despite the 
economic integration due to technological advances, new technologies do not significantly 
reduce liability of foreignness in the context of knowledge-seeking motivations for 
investments in foreign markets. In other words, direct investments are still the only way to tap 
untouched sources of knowledge (Denk et Al., 2012). Besides what a company perceives, 
market unfamiliarity – also defined unfamiliarity hazard - is an actual source of disadvantage 
and costs arising from it are due to incorrect market assessment, insufficient and erroneous 
information and inadequate knowledge of the host country's culture, norms, values, and 
business practices (Eden and Miller, 2004).  
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According to internationalization process theorists associated with the Uppsala school 
Johanson and Vahlne (1977), one common pattern for market entry is a mix of pre and post-
entry strategies. Usually entrant firms learn about the foreign markets in two ways, first 
through local operators from which they can acquire knowledge, secondly by expanding to 
“foreign markets of successively greater psychic distance” (Petersen & Pedersen, 2002, 
p.341). Only later they would venture into any establishments in farther markets. This 
internationalization strategy allows companies to reduce substantially the unfamiliarity with 
the target market both before entering it, thanks to its knowledge about similar markets, and 
after the entrance by tapping local partners. Even Hymer (1960) himself suggested the use of 
licensing or local distributors to first enter a foreign market over the use of foreign direct 
investments: in fact local licensee or distributors wouldn’t be hampered by liability of 
foreignness. Moreover this strategy give the chance to the foreign investor to tap its local 
partner for market information and knowledge. 
Also Casson (1994) argued that learning processes are influenced by a sort of economies of 
scope, and firms who had already internationalized have less difficulties in learning about 
foreign environments. About the same issue Barkema et al. (1996) discussed how early 
expansion in geographically closer market before moving to farther ones could lead to more 
successful patterns for internationalization than a diversified strategy. Zaheer (2002) though 
argues that this kind of sequential pattern may not contribute to gain local market knowledge 
because of the opportunism and moral hazard issues involved in agency relationships. 
Moreover these studies do not take into consideration that also local companies are always 
involved in learning processes: the focus then should be on relative learning rates of foreign 
versus local firms (Zaheer, 2002). 
Mezias (2002) warned that an important factor to take into consideration when formulating a 
strategy to improve the adaptation is the staffing strategy: the use of locals or expats in 
executive positon can affect the liability of foreignness. For example if top management is 
staffed with more locals, adaptation is likely to be smoother thanks to a better understanding 
of local practices. Adaptation is also linked to another factor, which is the relationships 
between parent and subsidiary; subsidiaries in general face conflicting pressure to adapt 
locally and maintain internal consistency with parent‘s organizational practices (Rosenzweig 
& Singh, 1991). The degree of local adaptation resulting from this internal conflict influences 
liability of foreignness. Other drivers affecting liability of foreignness are finally the level of 
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global operations, which may proxy the degree of international experience, and the 
involvement in the host country, which could affect, again, the adaptation to the environment 
(Mezias, 2002). Sometimes to reduce LOF is not necessary to adapt organizational practices 
themselves, as shown by Sofka and Zimmermann’s (2008) findings. They argue that the 
degree of liability of foreignness is not uniform in the host country. In particular, according to 
their study, regional economic differences in a country can be exploited by foreign companies 
to mitigate the effect of liability of foreignness. In a situation of economic stress for example 
local customers could re-evaluate their decision patterns, giving foreign firms and their 
products a window of opportunity. In other terms, potential customers in economically 
depressed regions evaluate products more objectively and rely less intensively on country of 
origin stereotypes (Sofka and Zimmermann, 2008). 
An alternative view is provided by Luo et Al. (2002), who maintain that a company has two 
options to minimize liability of foreignness, offensive or defensive strategies (Figure 6). 
Defensive mechanisms consist of (1) contract protection; (2) parental control; (3) parental 
service; and (4) output standardization. Offensive or proactive mechanisms comprise (1) local 
networking; (2) resource commitment; (3) legitimacy improvement; and (4) input localization. 
The main difference between these two sets of options is the strategic goal; while defensive 
mechanisms are aimed to reduce company’s interactions with the local market, minimizing 
risks, offensive actions are employed to maximize local adaptation and increase its legitimacy 
in the market environment.  
Luo et Al. (2002) argue a defensive strategy helps to reduce costs, offensive strategy instead 
increases returns. In their study they analyze the effect of two strategies – contracts as a 
defensive one and local networking as offensive – in the Chinese market. Their findings show 
that not only these mechanisms have the expected effect (reducing cost the former, increasing 
returns the latter), but also they are not adversary and can be used in a complementary way. 
Their findings in fact show how the better performers in the market are those foreign 
companies who use both the methods. 
33 
 
 
Figure 6 – Different Strategies to mitigate LOF 
 
Source: Luo et Al. (2002) 
Holistic theories  
Several studies analyzed the nature and effect of costs of doing business abroad from different 
perspective – e.g. institutional, RBV, etc. – but Sethi and Guisinger (2002) argued that most 
of them “represent only isolated snapshots of the phenomenon and have failed to view this 
liability holistically” (p. 224). The traditional dualistic view of liability of foreignness, who 
frame the disadvantages a foreign subsidiary faces compared to the local competitors, is 
“static and constricted” and not suitable to describe the whole set of costs of operating in an 
international business environment (IBE), which can be defined as an enhanced 
conceptualization of liability of foreignness (Sethi & Guisinger, 2002). In fact the globalized 
market is way too complex and companies, also native ones, have to deal with several volatile 
factors who cannot be studied only by considering the interactions between the two firms. 
Since the original conception of liability of foreignness is limited to the foreign subsidiary 
within a host-country’s context, it does not consider other costs arising from increased multi-
country operations and complex interdependence of the global environment (Kobrin, 1995). 
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Since IBE is the turf where firms compete on the global market, and given its high complexity 
and volatility, good reading capabilities, defined by Sethi and Guisinger (2002) as “scanning, 
interpretation, synthesis and analysis” (pag.224) are considered by the authors a must-have to 
overcome the liability of foreignness and sometimes even an enhancer of competitive 
advantage towards local enterprises. Because reading skills are connected to strategy 
formulation and implementation, internal development is ideal, but it’s not the only way to 
acquire them: also partnerships, networks, localization and commitment to demand’s 
matching resources are meant to better read the environment. Nevertheless IBE reading 
capabilities by themselves cannot represent a competitive advantage, the firm’s core 
competencies are of course the major driver. Only in fast-paced and highly volatile industries 
reading capabilities may be a core competence that allows companies to quickly understand 
market changes and adapt accordingly. Foreign companies thus should leverage their 
international experience and network, the so-called reading skills, to contrast the liability of 
foreignness (Sethi and Guisinger, 2002).  
A step further has been taken in the holistic perspective by Sethi and Judge (2009). They in 
fact maintain that not only the whole set of costs of doing business abroad must be taken into 
consideration, but also the benefits of doing business abroad should be. Their framework 
distinguish between costs incurred from the subsidiary while doing business in the single host 
country - liability of foreignness – and costs incurred when interacting with the international 
environment outside the host country - liability of multinationality. The same distinction is 
applied to benefits, or assets, which can arise in the host country context or from international 
activities of the subsidiary (Sethi and Judge, 2009). The impact, positive or negative, is thus 
the combined effect of all these forces.  
35 
 
 
Table 1 – Summary of Theories Analyzed 
Theory  Brief description 
Resource Based View  A firm’s competitive advantage, and thus its 
ability to offset LOF is founded on its resources 
and capabilities.  
Institutional theories  Institutions push companies to adapt in order to 
gain legitimacy and reduce the LOF generated 
by an unknown or even hostile environment. 
Cultural Theories  Nationality, and its culture together, could be a 
driver of liability of foreignness itself (Moeller et 
al., 2013). 
Internationalization process theories The way companies engage with a target market, 
and the strategies adopted once entered, will 
influence the level of LOF actually faced. 
Holistic theories The dualistic view of LOF seen as the 
disadvantages faced by foreign companies 
compared to local ones is no more suitable for a 
globalized world and should then be replaced by 
wider concepts like the IBE.   
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Conclusion 
We saw that liability of foreignness has been analyzed from several perspective, summarized 
in table 1, and even if the concept has been engaged from different levels of analysis and 
studies have sometimes found conflicting results I believe there is no definitive theory that 
can describe the phenomenon. The global market include such a huge variety  of situations 
and environment that would be impossible to define a single framework that manage to 
describe all of it without losing a significant level of detail. Scholars find themselves then in 
front of a trade-off when conducting a new research or developing a new theory: they can 
focus on a very specific aspect of the matter, or they can renounce details in favor of a more 
comprehensive view. Of course this choice can be positioned on a continuum of specificity 
and can be difficult to assess where exactly a research is collocated on it.  
Several studies taken into consideration so far, even if not explicitly, target developed market. 
The increased importance of emerging economies though requires both for academic and 
business reasons theoretical models that are applicable to all markets. Hence makes sense to 
wonder if the same empirical results and consequent conclusions are still valid in developing 
countries. We will now first review some of the most recent researches that focused 
specifically on developing – or transforming – economies, and later we will analyze the 
Chinese market. China in fact is nowadays the second global economic power after the United 
States and its unique culture and business practices strongly influence the strategy of local and 
foreign companies operating in the market. 
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Chapter 3: Liability of Foreignness in developing countries 
Introduction  
Most of the studies on liability of foreignness have focused on developed countries, but with 
the increasingly globalized market and the rise of new economies like India, China, Mexico, 
Indonesia and so on, it is worth and necessary to focus on the costs of doing business abroad 
also in these emerging markets. Companies from both developed and developing countries are 
nowadays investing more and more in emerging economies, either as part of a global supply 
chain or as final consumer markets, given the growing middle class that characterizes these 
countries. The main difference of operating in emerging markets compared to industrialized 
ones is the transitional nature of their industrial and institutional environments, which brings 
enormous opportunities for foreign firms but also high instability and operational uncertainty 
(Luo et Al. 2002). We will first analyze the market conditions of emerging economies to 
understand why are they so different and how to deal with liability of foreignness in these 
situations. We will later focus on China, its peculiar characteristics and the most common 
strategies adopted by foreign companies in the market. 
Transitioning economies: an overview of market conditions 
Transforming economies are characterized by highly volatile, uncertain and changing 
institutional environment (Yildiz & Fey, 2012): under these circumstances, liability of 
foreignness is amplified, due to both an unpredictable institutional framework and a structural 
industrial uncertainty, which makes very difficult to control external environment.  
According to Peng et Al. (2008) many studies on developed economies take institutional 
framework as a background and maintain that it’s not among the main factors influencing 
firms’ strategy. From another perspective, when markets work smoothly in developed 
economies, the market-supporting institutions are almost invisible (McMillan, 2007). But 
when markets work poorly like in emerging economies the lack of strong institutions, either 
because they are in a transition phase, either because they are still underdeveloped, has a very 
strong impact on both domestic and foreign companies and they must take it into 
consideration when formulating their strategy. A good example is the study from Makino et 
Al. (2004) where they show how performance of subsidiaries of foreign companies in 
emerging countries are influenced more from country-specific factors – proxies for 
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institutional differences - in contrast with subsidiaries in developed countries, whose 
performance is more related to firm-specific effects.  
In transforming economies it’s very important to evaluate carefully the institutional 
background, because when the rules of the game (North, 1990) are subject to high variability, 
is difficult to choose the best strategy to adopt. As Peng et Al. (2008) put it, the key question 
for both local and foreign companies is: “how to play the game when the rules of the game are 
changing and not completely known?” (p.924). 
Alternative point of view - Transitioning economies and lower LOF  
As opposed to the aforementioned authors, according to who foreign companies face a higher 
level of liability of foreignness in developing countries due to increased uncertainty, others 
maintain that the transitioning nature of these markets doesn’t necessarily increase LOF. 
According to this alternative view transforming economies like those of emerging markets do 
not always have a negative effect on liability of foreignness. In fact multinational enterprises 
might face lower pressure by underdeveloped or changing institutions, as often is the case of 
developing economies. For example Kostova and Zaheer (1999) argue that foreign 
subsidiaries may benefit from their foreignness when a political, economic or social upheaval 
is going on in the host country. The same authors also maintain that foreign companies have 
an advantage where stakeholders in the institutional environment has a “long-standing sense 
of inferiority and xenophilia” (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999).  
Perez-Batres and Eden (2008) maintain instead that transitioning institutions not only affect 
foreign investments, but also local businesses, and define liability of localness the set of 
added costs faced by domestic players during periods of uncertain market environment. 
According to them regulatory changes give opportunities to foreign investments by changing 
the rules of the game (North, 1990) to which local players are used to. Jiang and Stening 
(2013) go even further, saying that liability of localness persists after the institutional turmoil 
is over in those markets where foreign companies still have a solid competitive advantage 
over domestic firms, and this is particularly true in developing countries.  
Dealing with stakeholders in transforming economies  
A country’s institutional structure is impersonalized by the main groups of stakeholders who 
put pressure on all the companies and influence their strategies. According to Yildiz and Fey 
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(2012) transforming economies are characterized by three aspects that influence not only 
firms’ strategy but also the way stakeholders affect it: first, these economies are by definition 
undergoing more or less rapid transformations where old institutions are substituted by new 
ones. Second, these changes are likely to result in contemporary existence of old and new 
norms, increasing uncertainty and volatility, but also giving several market opportunities to 
new entrants. Third, emerging countries are most of the times weaker economies compared to 
developed countries, where usually FDI come from, and this can give to local consumers a 
better perception of foreign brands.  
Given the aforementioned characteristics Yildiz and Fey (2012) argue that foreign enterprises 
can sometimes find ways to reduce institutional pressure for homogeneity and pursue their 
goals without necessarily foregoing legitimacy, therefore avoiding those strategies that are 
aimed to better adapt to the local environment. Also Nachum (2003) argued that the firm 
performance in a foreign market the result of the combined effect of pressure from local 
institutions and the advantages of being an MNE. In particular it’s possible to address four 
groups of stakeholders that are commonly thought to put pressure on foreign companies – 
suppliers, customers, employees and government (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983) – in order to 
reduce or ignore this pressure. 
Relationship with suppliers is vital in order to secure the acquisition of critical resources at 
more favorable terms (Deepouse, 1999), and sometimes even to just acquire scarcely 
available resources. This would normally entail strong ties with domestic suppliers and 
therefore a higher demand for adaptation and legitimacy. In emerging economies risks 
associated with local procurement are higher, hence companies that can rely on a wider global 
or international supply network tend to curb their dependence on domestic suppliers getting 
more resources from there (Luo, 2003). Therefore ensuring the acceptance and support of 
local supplier may not always be a major concern (Yildiz & Fey, 2012).  
In standard conditions foreign companies are forced to adapt their marketing mix in order to 
appeal to cultural values and expectations of local customers, especially in those countries 
where consumers are ethnocentric and have positive bias towards domestic products (Klein, 
2002). This is not always true though in developing countries where, as mentioned before, 
often foreign brands are perceived as of better quality or value. This positive consumer bias in 
transforming economies is defined as “consumer amity” by (Baughn & Yaprak, 1993). 
Moreover the institutional change often bring with himself a shift in values and tastes, as 
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shown by Wan (1998) in his study on China, where economic reforms have brought massive 
changes in economic development and institutional transformations, and the impact on 
lifestyle and consumer behavior and preferences has been incredible. These changes can 
sometimes reduce the need for adaptation of products and services by foreign companies or 
could even make it counter-productive: in these cases foreign companies would face less 
pressure to local isomorphism.  
Hiring local employees in a foreign country is a critical process in order to successfully 
implement organizational practices, especially when establishing a new venture in a country 
with a high degree of cultural distance (Hofstede, 1980); often the foreign company is forced 
to adapt its practices in order to fit with local culture and avoid internal conflict. When hiring 
in emerging economies, Yildiz and Fey (2012) say, foreign companies have a better chance to 
find employees with values compatible with the firm’s one due to the transitional status of the 
environment. The ongoing institutional transformation in these countries brings higher level 
of diversity of cultural values among different social groups in terms of education, interests 
and orientations. Cultural and social differences in a given country allows foreign companies 
to import their organizational practices and reduces the need of local adaptation if they focus 
their hiring effort on employees who can better fit these practices (Yildiz and Fey, 2012). 
We have already mentioned that often local government and formal institutions can harass 
foreign companies, targeting them with laws and other instruments in order to protect 
domestic firms and national interest in general. For emerging market though FDIs are often 
the most effective way to realize sustainable growth and it’s common for government of these 
countries to incentivize foreign companies to set up subsidiaries within their border, either 
with tax incentives or with infrastructure support. The relationship between governments and 
foreign companies therefore do not always end up with increased LOF, since the net effects of 
foreignness depend on the interaction between the two parties (Henisz & Zelner, 2005). 
Table 2 below summarize the two point of view: 1) the more traditional institutional view 
according to which companies will adapt to local environment under the pressure of 
institutions, in order to increase their legitimacy with stakeholders; 2) the other alternative 
view from Yildiz and Fey (2012), according to which foreign enterprises are not always 
forced to adapt in transitioning markets because of the particular conditions affecting these 
markets. 
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Table 2 – Characteristics of stakeholders in transforming economies.  
Stakeholder Traditional view Alternative view 
Suppliers Implement strong connections 
with local suppliers in order to 
increase legitimacy and improve 
sourcing capabilities  
Global or international supply network 
to curb dependence on domestic 
suppliers. 
Customers Adapt marketing mix to local 
tastes and culture. 
Consumer amity: foreign brand are 
perceived as better than local in 
developing countries.  
Employees Hiring and retaining employees in 
culturally distant countries often 
present a trade-off between 
maintaining organizational 
practices and avoid internal 
conflict.  
The value shift often ongoing in 
transforming economies may influence 
locals’ values and culture to adapt to 
foreign companies’ organizational 
culture. 
Government Protectionism by mean of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers. 
Government in developing countries 
tend to incentivize FDI to boost 
economic growth.  
Adapted from: Yildiz and Fey (2012) 
All the aforementioned situations of course are not valid in every developing country, and the 
listed strategies are not available for all companies operating in a foreign market. In fact 
Yildiz and Fey (2012) when describing these alternative strategies mostly refer to MNEs. This 
does not mean that smaller firms can never adopt these strategies, but it’s clear that it would 
be more difficult, and sometimes even impossible for companies lacking the resources or the 
recognition available for multinational enterprises. A host government for example is more 
likely to give incentives to big companies that can bring a significant rise of employment level 
and heavy investments rather than to SMEs that can hardly guarantee the same results.  
Moreover, as already mentioned, these situations cannot apply to every developing economy 
in the same way. Emerging economies are indeed characterized by common factors, but are 
also different between each other and therefore present unique market conditions. I have 
focused in particular on China, which has a very complex and dynamic business environment 
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and offer a rich context to analyze liability of foreignness (Luo et Al., 2002). In the next 
section I will go through its peculiar characteristics and later on I will describe what the main 
strategies according to the relevant literature are. 
China: a unique country 
China has seen an unprecedented economic growth in the last thirty years that brought the 
country to be the second economy in the world, second only to the United States. This 
nonetheless doesn’t make its business environment comparable to other mature markets in 
developed countries, those considered as first world countries. The Cambridge Dictionary 
defines a developed country as “a country with a lot of industrial activity and where people 
generally have high incomes” (dictionary.cambridge.org), and commonly are included in this 
category countries with high Income per-capita and a preponderant proportion of tertiary 
sector in their economy. 
China in fact, a huge and diverse market, is characterized by extremely different regions, from 
the most advanced and economically developed cities on the eastern coast to remote villages 
of central and western China, and is still therefore somewhere in the middle between the 
status of developing and developed country. Moreover the country has been mostly rural until 
recent years and despite the economic boom brought its economic performance to the top of 
the world the institutions couldn’t quite keep the pace and are not fully developed as you 
would expect in a developed country. 
Market overview  
Even though Chinese economy is the second most powerful of the world in terms of GDP, it 
cannot be considered a developed economy. Indeed by the most commonly used to criteria 
used to considered a country as developed (e.g. GDP per-capita, level of industrialization and 
more recently the Human Development Index), China cannot be included in this restricted 
club. These criteria though do not show the full picture. China for some aspects, especially in 
the most developed regions, has levels of technological adoption (for example the market 
penetration of smartphones or internet) comparable, if not superior, to more developed 
countries. 
What really makes the difference are the institutions that as already mentioned could not 
really keep up with the pace of economic development and are still, also in major cities, in a 
transitioning stage.  Transitioning institutions means of course high uncertainty and volatility, 
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which together with non-transparent government policies and a peculiar business culture (Luo 
et Al., 2002) make the market a very complex one, where LOF is commonly considered to be 
higher than in other emerging markets. Considering that until the beginning of economic 
reforms and the opening to the world under Deng Xiaoping ruling from 1978 China’s 
institutions were virtually non-existent, together with commercial laws and their enforcement 
(Ahlstrom et Al., 2003), it’s no surprise that an efficient legal structure has not been 
implemented yet. Moreover the continuous overlapping of local and national laws and 
regulations and the inconsistency of their application has definitely not helped to speed up the 
process. 
Someone could wonder how the Chinese economic miracle was possible in such a uncertain 
and poorly regulated business environment. Peng (2005) suggests that when formal 
institutions are missing, informal institutions, such as norms and conventions, will 
compensate for the lack of them. In china for example private companies have been legalized 
only after the economic reforms began, and they have been politically less favored than SOE: 
this pushed them to adopt carefully legitimacy building strategies (Ahlstrom et al., 2008). 
Ahlstrom includes among these strategies seeking financial resources that can be safeguarded 
from government interferences and creating connections with influential actors that can 
guarantee legitimacy and protection. Also Peng et Al. (2008) maintain that the large influence 
of personal relationships - Guanxi in Chinese – on companies’ strategy is an effect of the lack 
of formal institutions, even though other authors suggest that this characteristic is a peculiarity 
of Chinese culture (Redding, 1990). 
What Guanxi is and how it works   
Guanxi is indeed deeply embedded in the Chinese culture and society that have been 
functioning within clan-like network ever since Confucius codified societal rules, values, and 
hierarchical structures of authority during the sixth century B.C. (Luo et Al.,2008), and only 
recently has been opened to western style business laws. Guanxi therefore is still permeating 
every aspect of the society, influencing both private life and business.  
But what is actually Guanxi in Chinese? The word is in most dictionaries translated in English 
as “connections, relations, or relationships”, but this definition can’t really convey the full 
meaning of the term. Wong et Al. (2003) explain the etymology of the term: the character 
Guan ( 关 ) means in this case “door lock”, and the character Xi ( 系 ) means instead “system 
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of links”. Therefore the Guanxi can be understood according to Fernandez and Underwood 
(2005) as “a connection between two parties through a links when one party chooses to open 
one link to the other party” (p. 2). In other words, Guanxi can be considered a network of 
connections and relationships that can serve as social currency, granting access to information, 
opportunities, resources (Tsui et Al. 2000). Especially in a business context, it contains 
implicit mutual obligations, assurances and understanding, and it is the foundation of long-
term relationships in the Chinese society (Luo et Al., 2002): according to Wang (2007) 
Guanxi is personal, reciprocal, and utilitarian. In this kind of relationships the two parties 
should always respect a set of unspoken rules of reciprocity and equity and violation of these 
rules can bring to the loss of “face”, or Mian ( 面 ), a loss of prestige and legitimacy not only 
with the other party involved, but within the whole network. It’s important to notice that 
Guanxi is not exploitation or manipulation, because all those involved are well aware of the 
rules of reciprocity and that the exchange of favors is fundamental to maintain the relationship. 
Even though Guanxi is always built between individuals, interpersonal connections always 
transform to inter-organizational connections in the Chinese society and thus become a 
valuable resource to overcome liability of foreignness. In fact unlike Western society, where 
inter-organizational connections come first and inter-personal connections will follow if the 
former cooperation is successful, in China interpersonal relations are a prerequisite to inter-
organizational interlocks (Luo, 2000). Thanks to strong relationships among key managers in 
the organizations involved, Guanxi then can be utilized as an asset at the organizational level 
to improve the relationship and reduce pressure from external shareholders. The personal 
nature of Guanxi has an evident drawback though. Since the relationship resides in the 
individual manager himself, in the case the manager decides to leave he takes all his business 
Guanxi with him, the more the manager was a high level one, the bigger the loss in term of 
relational assets for the firm (Fernandez & Underwood, 2005). In china hiring or retaining 
somebody is not only about his skills and capabilities. 
Not understanding how Guanxi works then can seriously hinder a company’s performance in 
the country. It is in fact so pervasive that foreign enterprises are, or will be, certainly affected 
directly or indirectly by its effect on social and business dynamics. Only understanding it 
though often is not enough: a foreign firm who can not only understand how Guanxi works, 
but also how to use it can effectively on one hand  increase cultural adaptation, and on the 
other hand reduce institutional uncertainty (Luo et Al., 2002). 
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Corruption, red tape and uncertainty 
The existence of Guanxi, and the exchange of favors that is part of its mechanisms, has also a 
drawback. The other side of the coin is that corruption can thrive in an environment where 
favors are not only largely common, but also socially accepted and incentivized. In other 
words, Guanxi even if not necessarily an origin or source of corruption, it’s a facilitator (Luo, 
2008). According to the same author Guanxi and corruption are becoming more and more 
intertwined, and he expects that they could eventually be undistinguishable from each other 
becoming a threat to the social and economic reforms occurred in the last three decades. Even 
those companies who play fair - hopefully the majority - are affected by corruption in two 
ways: 1) directly when officers in various government branches explicitly ask for favors (e.g. 
gifts, money) in order to do something that they are supposed to do or 2) indirectly when 
officers impede or slow down the regular procedure to favor somebody else. Foreign 
enterprises should be aware that corruption is widely common and they could find themselves 
affected, and therefore be prepared to deal with it.  
Nonetheless Guanxi is not the only thing that let corruption flourish: also the highly 
bureaucratic nature of public offices is a fertile soil for it. In fact red tape in china is one of the 
biggest issues and affect both local and foreign companies in their activities. The amount of 
paperwork and the timeline to apply for any kind of license, or just to be compliant from the 
accounting and tax point of view is unbelievable and often stunning for companies that face it 
for the first time. It’s easy to understand how in such a rigid and heavily regulated business 
environment Guanxi – or corruption – is widely used to shorten timelines or unlock a specific 
situation.  
Red tape though is only part of the problem. Chinese administrative structure indeed doesn’t 
help in this sense. Regional and municipal governments have a certain degree of autonomy for 
both interpret and enforce national laws, without mentioning a number of local policy which 
are exclusivity of these institutional bodies (Rossi & Fasulo, 2016). In addition often the 
application of policies is de facto discretional, to the point that two officers in the same 
government department, in the same city and even in the same office can ask for a different 
set of documents for the same procedure. The consequent uncertainty may result in additional 
delays in the already slow bureaucratic machine.    
46 
 
 
Chinese protectionism 
Chinese economy is still nowadays affected by its planned economy heritage and the market, 
even though part of the WTO and open to foreign investments, is not yet to be considered a 
fully free economy. In fact China has completed officially his transition to open economy in 
2007, fulfilling all the obligations required to be part of the World Trade Organization, but 
non-tariff barriers didn’t decrease quite as consistently and have instead kept growing (Rossi 
& Fasulo, 2016). Many sectors are still not accessible to FDI, and others are available only 
under certain restrictions in term of ownership, forcing the creation of joint ventures. So even 
if foreign companies have been incentivized in several ways - sometimes specifically tailored 
incentives in case of big multinationals - to invest in the country in the past three decades, 
investors have never been guaranteed a full equality in terms of opportunities. And the picture 
is getting grimmer in recent years, with a reduction of incentives and the proliferation of 
stricter policies that have favored local enterprises. The disadvantages are even bigger 
compared to State-owned enterprises, that still make up a large portion of the economy and 
are of course advantaged when it comes to public auctions, subsidies, access to credit.  
Protectionism doesn’t manifest itself only in explicit laws, but also in the enforcement of 
labor and business laws that are supposed to be the same for every firm, local and foreign. 
Foreign companies are indeed much more controlled by the officials in the mentioned 
authorities than local firms: the result is that local companies manage to get away very easily 
if they are not compliant with law, because controls are looser or because authorities turn 
sometimes a blind eye. If this is a result of pressures from the central authorities or simply 
part of the public stigmatization mentioned by Vernon (1977) we can’t know, but it is an 
actual issue. 
HR management 
As always when operating in a foreign market, companies have to deal with additional issues 
when hiring local employees. In general, as already mentioned, different culture and values 
make more complex to find employees who can fit in the organizational culture and thus 
companies need to choose between maintaining their corporate identity or increase the local 
adaptation (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989). Moreover in case a company hire a mix of local and 
expatriate employees the risk of misunderstandings is very high. This is even more true when 
the local culture is very peculiar and the market has only recently been opened to foreign 
investments, like in China.   
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According to Wu (2009) in China human resource management didn’t develop consistently 
with the economic growth and many foreign firms realized how different and complex is to 
hire and retain skilled labor force. First of all, decades of planned economy, where job 
security and career were not affected by performance, created a managerial class not 
motivated and committed, and the legacy of this culture is still recognizable nowadays. 
Foreign companies then find themselves in competition between each other and with domestic 
enterprises in order to hire experienced and motivated managers and employees.  
Hiring is only one side of the coin. Once companies have found and hired suitable employees, 
and maybe invested time and money to train them, the real challenge is to retain them. China 
indeed has a staggering turnover rate which represents a source of high uncertainty for 
employers who are forced then to hire extra staff  and have organizational slack. For example 
according to the website China Briefing (2015) in 2013, 35% of Chinese staff employed at 
international companies had changed jobs in the past two to four years, and 10.4% of 
employees had found a new job within the previous year.  
There are several reasons behind this trend: first, the high demand for job on one side 
increases competition for the best employees and on the other side reduces risks of 
unemployment for those employees who quit. Second, due to the fast economic growth and 
consequent rise of wages, employees are likely to leave their company for a better paid job 
and this is also the main reason to leave according to Leininger (2004). Lastly Chinese cities 
are packed with internal migrants, workers from the countryside and rural provinces who 
moved to the more industrialized regions or cities for a few years in order to make a small 
fortune and later go back to their hometown to live a better life. These employees are not 
likely to commit to one specific company or the other, since their goal is not a lifelong 
employment, but the maximization of their revenues. Due to the recent economic slowdown, 
in major coastal cities the trend has slightly changed, because of lower demand, which makes 
quitting job riskier, and because of the evolution of economic structure in these cities, where 
less unskilled workers from rural areas are required, in favor of qualified workers. In second 
and third tier cities though, where GDP growth is higher than the national average, the 
problem is still a major concern. 
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Overcoming liability of foreignness in China 
As previously described China has several peculiar characteristics adding up to the common 
issues usually encountered in transitioning economies. This particular environment is very 
complex for foreign enterprises that are likely to face higher levels of LOF compared to other 
countries (Luo et Al., 2002) and are forced to implement suitable strategies in order to 
overcome it and gain competitive advantage.  
Institutional advantage  
Li and Zhou (2010) suggest that an important role is played by the ability to secure scarce 
resources and gain institutional support from local government, which they define 
institutional advantage. This advantage nonetheless is not a direct driver of superior 
performance, but it leads to both differentiation and cost advantages, which are sources of 
competitive advantage and thus enhance superior performance. First, institutional advantage 
allows firms to seize critical resources more effectively, which in a situation of resource 
shortage can guarantee differentiation if competitors do not have access to those resources. 
Even in case resources are available to competitors, with institutional advantage a company 
can acquire them at a lower cost, which gives instead the firm a cost advantage. Second, in a 
country where the interpretation and enforcement of rules are subject to authorities’ discretion 
(Luo, 2006), their support is determinant to conduct business more efficiently.  
According to Li and Zhou (2010) the best method to achieve institutional advantage is the use 
of managerial ties, or what we have defined as Guanxi. As previously described Guanxi is a 
network of connections between individuals inside organizations that are based on mutual 
trust and sometimes even friendship and that include implicit obligation of assistance and 
exchange of favors. Building a good relationship with suppliers and clients – and stakeholders 
in general - is not the only way Guanxi helps to overcome LOF: on one hand in fact it is a 
very pervasive business practice in the country and foreign companies who can improve their 
network and implement its mechanics can reduce the cultural gap, increasing then its local 
adaptation and  legitimacy. On the other hand Guanxi is a key factor to reduce the institutional 
uncertainty characterizing the market; it can be an instrument for companies to circumvent the 
slow Chinese bureaucracy and can give the chance to secure scarce resources or give an 
insight on precious information that are not commonly available. Luo (2006) for example 
maintain that local government’s support is very important because the legal system is not 
reliable and subject to particularism and personal accommodation. Building up a good Guanxi 
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network is as difficult as it’s important for foreign companies. While local companies already 
have an established base of connections (e.g. relatives, friends, ex-colleagues, etc.) foreign 
enterprises cannot count on such thing and should therefore spend way more effort and 
resources to build a comparable network (Luo et Al., 2002).  
Defensive and offensive strategies 
Also according to Luo et Al. (2002) Guanxi network implementation is a key strategy used to 
overcome LOF in China, but differently from Li and Zhou’s idea, it is not suitable to achieve 
cost advantages; Luo et Al. (2002) maintain indeed that another strategy widely used by 
foreign companies, contract protection, is more suitable to achieve them. The two strategies 
are diametrically opposed in the general framework of offensive and defensive mechanisms 
previously described in Chapter 2: in this view contract protection is a defensive strategy 
aimed to reduce uncertainty and safeguard company’s rights against opportunism, Guanxi 
implementation is an offensive strategy used to improve local adaptation and proactively 
increase returns: it is indeed considered the most powerful proactive mechanism in China by 
Peng & Luo (2000). Their findings show that both contracts and Guanxi help foreign 
enterprises reducing LOF, the firsts by decreasing production and marketing costs – cost 
advantages -, the second by enhancing sales revenues - differentiation.  
Even though China still lacks a well-established legal systems which can properly enforce 
laws and regulations and local player do not always consider signed contracts binding, giving 
instead priority to Guanxi connections, with the growth and internationalization of Chinese 
companies, contracts are playing an increasingly important role in the business environment, 
especially when dealing with foreign companies. Many Chinese firms realize indeed that 
traditional business practices cannot be applied in relationships with companies from other 
countries that do not understand them (Luo et Al., 2002). Moreover as explained by Li and 
Sheng (2011) the significance of connection diminish with the growth and ageing of the firm, 
that should instead develop more market-based capabilities and implement market-oriented 
strategies. 
It’s important to notice in fact that sometimes Guanxi can hinder firm performance if the 
company have too tight connections: managerial ties can be detrimental in a situation of 
demand uncertainty or technological turbulence, since the company could find itself stuck 
with existing connections and might not be able to adapt quickly to changing market 
requirements. Moreover as mentioned above Guanxi utilization has a declining effect on 
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profitability of older firms. Guanxi then is very useful in the beginning stage of a company’s 
life or during the developing of new markets or opportunities, but it could lose in 
effectiveness with the age of companies and fail to help them in achieving further growth if 
new connections are not created. These ties should shift over time in order to avoid becoming 
“encumbered with stale advice, protection, information, and resources” (Li & Sheng, 2011. 
p.566). The significance of connection according to this view diminish with the growth and 
internationalization of the firm, that should develop more market-based capabilities and 
implement market-oriented strategies. Market orientation places the highest priority on the 
profitable creation and maintenance of superior customer value (Slater & Narver, 1995) and 
enables enterprises, by paying attention to target customers interests, watching competitors 
closely and coordinating its functional units better, to effectively understand and timely 
respond to market changes, which is in a country like China a key factor to overcome liability 
of foreignness. 
Nonetheless even the most modern Chinese firms are influenced, and they will probably 
always be, by Chinese culture and for instance they will never consider a contract enough to 
sustain a long-term relationship: they will likely perceive it as a way to safeguard each party’s 
rights during a short-term relationship or one-off transaction. A client will come back and 
place more orders not because of a previous contract, but because a good relationship is in 
place, ceteris paribus. Contract protection is thus a useful method to overcome LOF reducing 
costs related to uncertainty and opportunism, but not a way to increase revenues, like Guanxi 
instead is.  
Therefore, even though with the modernization of China managerial ties are partially losing 
their predominance in business transactions in favor of more market-oriented mechanisms, 
Guanxi will remain a very important component of the business environment in the country 
and a powerful instrument to reduce and overcome liability of foreignness. Companies do not 
face a trade-off between the use market orientation and the implementation of managerial ties 
– or in other words defensive and offensive strategies -, because the two mechanisms do not 
preclude each other, and are in fact complementary (Luo et Al. 2002): according to their 
finding firms who implement both have on average better performance than those who 
implement only one, regardless their choice. 
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Adapting strategies and practices to the Chinese market 
A recent research by Rossi and Fasulo (2016) suggest that foreign companies shall adopt a 
focused set of strategies to operate in the Chinese market, and shouldn’t stick to standardized 
organizational practices that might be suitable in other countries. Too often Chinese 
subsidiaries and their managers are not given the strategic weight they deserve; consequently 
in these cases they are not represented in the top management and they are not part of 
strategic decision making process. Moreover their findings confirm that a pre-entry learning 
engagement (Petersen & Pedersen, 2002) might be a useful method to reduce liability of 
foreignness when a firm eventually enter the market. 
Despite pre-entry learning engagement, and consistently with Denk et Al. (2012) who 
maintain that FDI are the only way to tap untouched sources of knowledge, foreign companies 
will be disadvantaged in comparison with domestic ones and should adopt focused strategies 
to overcome LOF. Among those mentioned by Rossi and Fasulo (2016) there are the 
appointment of experienced and skilled managers, differentiation, “becoming Chinese” (p.46) 
or targeting high-end niches, responsiveness to a changing market. 
As mentioned before hiring and retaining skilled employees is a serious issue in China, and 
it’s even more complicated when it comes to managers. Many foreign companies have 
struggled to build up a solid and stable management team in their Chinese subsidiaries, which 
often include many expatriates who are not willing to stay in China more than a few years. 
These foreign managers moreover often are not even senior employees in the organization, or 
they don’t have a deep knowledge of Chinese market. This highlights the low attention that 
sometimes is payed to Chinese operations, that should instead be a main concern for the 
company. In general according to Rossi and Fasulo (2016) would be ideal to appoint 
somebody with previous experience in both the market and the industry, and if not possible at 
least provide an appropriate training to those who will be appointed. The advantage of hiring 
managers with Chinese experience is not only in the strategic knowledge they can bring 
within the company, but also their soft skills in managing employees. The research conducted 
by Fernandez and Underwood (2005) clearly shows that qualities like patience and humility 
are important when it comes to deal with local employees, and that applying an aggressive 
western managerial style can be detrimental and has less success than a humbler approach. 
Moreover companies shouldn’t exclude the possibility to hire local employees as top 
managers of Chinese operations: this strategy could have some drawbacks in term of 
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organizational culture, but would greatly increase the adaptation to local environment, without 
forgetting the Guanxi baggage that these employees could bring into the organization. 
Starting from the idea that foreign companies need to adapt their strategy to the Chinese 
market, depending on their size and financials Rossi and Fasulo (2016) propose two choices. 
According to them a suitable way to compete with domestic companies is meet them in 
operational efficiency, reducing production and logistic costs and thus reducing the cost 
disadvantage. To do so foreign enterprises shall consider setting up their plants in central 
regions where labor costs are lower, restructuring operations and outsourcing,  increasing the 
level of automation of their processes. Of course these strategies assume a economies of scale 
and significant investments. Anyway it’s important to notice that even if the subsidiary can 
achieve its goals of efficiency, a strategy based only on cost advantages cannot, by itself, 
achieve competitive advantage in the short term and is not sustainable in the long term, 
especially in China.  
This is why foreign companies should always have a certain degree of differentiation in terms 
of brand, quality, value proposition or innovation. Companies that cannot afford or are not 
interested in huge investments in the country have an alternative choice: to focus on high-end 
or niche markets, less subject to local competition since target costumers value more quality 
and brand differentiation. In any case success is not granted even in this sector, given that this 
is the main market for imported goods in the country and Chinese consumers are still very 
influenced by the biggest brands. Intensive marketing activity and the right positioning are 
key factors of success in these cases.  
Considering the recent economic slowdown, the major reforms that are being implemented by 
the central government in these years and the evolving customer taste, according to Rossi and 
Fasulo (2016) foreign companies should also be able to cope with the fast evolving Chinese 
business environment. According to Fernandez and Underwood (2005) companies can be sure 
that in every moment there will be some aspects of their business changing. Market 
orientation (Li & Sheng, 2010) allows firms to “respond to market intelligence in a timely and 
efficient manner and deliver superior value to meet the unique needs of its market”(p.858). 
For instance the staggering growth of e-commerce in China is definitely something that 
companies have to take into account to re-think their distribution strategies accordingly. This 
need for agility could clash with the use of Guanxi networks, which could in some cases, as 
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stated by Li & Sheng (2010), affect the ability of the firm to quickly respond to market 
changes. 
All the strategies analyzed in the last section have their advantages and drawbacks and no one 
in particular can guarantee the achievement of competitive advantage. China is a very 
complex market and every company should find its own recipe. Table 3 shows a summary of 
the discussed strategies, with their most relevant PROs and CONs 
Table 3 – strategies to overcome LOF in China, PROs and CONs.      
Strategy PROs CONs 
Guanxi – 
Managerial Ties 
Proactive mechanism. Increases 
sales; reduces cultural gap and 
institutional uncertainty, enhances 
legitimacy; gives insight on 
exclusive information. 
Requires time and effort to 
implement. Could negative affect the 
ability of the company to quickly 
react to market changes. Can be less 
effective for older/bigger companies 
Market 
orientation 
Enables enterprises to effectively 
understand and timely respond to 
market changes. 
Sometimes not compatible with 
Guanxi networks. 
Contract 
protection 
Defensive mechanism. Safeguards 
the firm’s interest in business 
transactions and reduces related 
uncertainty. Gives cost advantages.  
Sometimes not effective in China 
because of the lack of institutional 
enforcement. Do not improve 
relationship with clients/suppliers. 
Hiring managers 
with “Chinese” 
experience 
Market knowledge. Improves 
adaptation and reduces cultural gap. 
Soft skills in managing local 
employees. Existing managerial 
ties.  
Difficult to hire and retain, thus 
expensive. Risk of loss of corporate 
culture due to excessive adaptation 
of organizational practices.  
Operational 
efficiency 
Reduces cost disadvantage thanks 
to economies of scale and 
optimization of processes. 
Very expensive. Requires intensive 
investments and effort. 
Target high-end 
/ niche markets 
Less competition from domestic 
players; less price competition. 
Many foreign brands in the market. 
Requires investments in marketing 
and the right positioning. 
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Conclusion 
We have seen that developing economies are characterized by peculiar traits that affect 
heavily the behavior of foreign firms and likely increase the liability of foreignness – even 
though some authors disagree with this statement. China in particular, as noticed by Luo et Al. 
(2002), presents a very complex environment for foreign companies which should pledge 
enough resources first to understand it, and of course to implement suitable strategies to cope 
with LOF. The list of problems encountered by foreign companies is very wide and can vary 
from company to company, as well as the strategies adopted. The aim of my research is to 
empirically assess what are the most problematic and frequent difficulties faced by foreign 
companies in China, how they are related to their particular situation and subsequently to 
understand what are the most adopted and effective strategies implemented to overcome the 
liability of foreignness deriving from them. 
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Chapter 4: Empirical Analysis 
Introduction 
We discussed in the previous chapters what is liability of foreignness and what are, according 
to the main literature, its drivers and its features. We also discussed the fact that LOF is 
different in developing or transitioning economies compared to developed markets, and that 
China in particular has some peculiar characteristics that make operating in the country very 
complex for foreign firms. I focused my research on this market because of its relevance in 
nowadays global economy and because I believe that despite studies have already been 
focused on it, the dynamics of the business environment are still unclear to many. 
The purpose of my research is to analyze what are, according to foreign firms’ managers 
experience, the main drivers of liability of foreignness here in China and how they are related 
to company characteristics. Data collection was conducted using a questionnaire which can be 
seen in annex 1, sent to foreign managers working in china or in charge of Chinese operations. 
The questionnaire was sent in August 2016 to 57 managers, and the response rate was 39%: 
22 filled questionnaire were collected. Due to the modest size of the sample, and the fact that 
all the companies in it are based in Shanghai, my findings are not definitive or descriptive of 
the whole Chinese market and shall be seen only as interesting insight into the complex 
business world of the country. 
Sample analysis 
As mentioned above the sample has been collected among companies based in Shanghai, the 
respondents are either living in the city either going there periodically to follow the business, 
thus they all have first-hand experience in the market. They all are of course foreigners and 
therefore their experience is valuable for the purpose of this research. Moreover, the sample is 
variegated, including companies from several countries and operating in different industries. 
The internationalization level of the foreign enterprise or group controlling the Chinese entity 
also vary from small companies at the beginning of their international expansion to bigger 
corporations with several subsidiaries in the world, even though the majority are SMEs. The 
size of the subsidiary itself changes among the sample, as the type of legal entity chosen. 
Lastly, most of the subsidiaries have been set-up in recent years, and no one in the sample has 
been established earlier than 15 years ago.the number of companies in the sample is 22. 
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Country 
The sample includes companies from different countries, even though more than 50% is from 
Italy. Of the 22 firms in fact, 12 are Italians. The remaining companies are from European 
countries like France (1), UK (3) and Germany (2) and from the USA (1) or Hong Kong (3). I 
considered foreign companies also those from HK for two reasons: the first is that the three 
companies in the sample were all founded by foreign individuals, so even if the legal entities 
might not be considered completely foreign in China, the individuals running them definitely 
are. The second reason is that the city-state, only recently part of the People’s Republic of 
China, has still a lot of autonomy, especially when it comes to business environment, with 
well-established institutions and an efficient juridical system. 
In order to run the analysis I coded the sample in 2 groups according to the country of origin: 
since the majority of firms is from Italy, the first group includes all these companies. The 
other countries are not represented by a sufficient number of companies to have each one a 
group on its own, so they have been included in a residual group as shown in figure 7 below. 
The two groups formed make up respectively the 55% (Italian) and 45% (Other) of the sample. 
Figure 7 – Composition of the sample | Country of origin 
 
Industry 
As mentioned before there is a big variety in terms of industry in the sample, with as many as 
15 industries represented, listed below in table 4.  
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Table 4 – Composition of the sample | Industry  
Industry N of companies 
Pharmaceuticals 1 
Electronics and computing machines 1 
Electrical machinery and machine tools 1 
Automotive and transportation equipment 1 
Mechanics 2 
Chemicals (no Pharmaceuticals) 1 
Rubber and plastic products 1 
Mineral products, petroleum products and basic metals 1 
Textile and apparel 2 
Home Furniture 3 
Agriculture 1 
Food and Beverages 1 
Retail, distribution and Logistics 1 
Architecture and Design 1 
Business and Financial Services 1 
Financial services 1 
Health Care 1 
Insurance and Bank 1 
 
Also in this case, in order to run my analysis, I had to split them in 3 groups that can 
supposedly share similar levels of liability of foreignness and same market conditions: High-
tech and Medium-tech industry, Low-tech industry, where I included also a couple of firms 
operating in the Primary sector, and Services. The sample in this case is quite evenly 
distributed in the three sectors, as highlighted in figure 8 below: firms working in the service 
industry are the 27% of the sample, while the other two groups equally include 36.5% of the 
sample. 
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Figure 8 – Composition of the sample | Industry 
 
Year of establishment 
Another indicator of the level of internationalization, but specifically in China, is the year of 
establishment of the subsidiary in China (the first one in case there are more), or what we can 
define Age of the subsidiary. Also in this case the sample is not evenly distributed in the 
interval and more than ¾ of the subsidiaries have been set-up not earlier than 2011. The oldest 
subsidiary was established in 2001. Figure 9 below shows the distribution of ages in the 
sample.  
Figure 9 – Composition of the sample | Number of firms per year of establishment 
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In order to highlight the different stages of their life in China, I split the sample in 3 age-based 
groups: 0 to 1 years; 2 to 5 years; more than 5 years. Figure 10 below shows how the sample 
is distributed in the three groups. 
Figure 10  - Composition of sample | Age 
 
Legal entity 
There are different type of legal entity that can be chosen by foreign investors when setting up 
a company in China, the most common is the Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise (WFOE), 
which is a limited company and is, as the name itself says, owned by foreign companies or 
individuals. In case one or more of the shareholders – but not all of them – are Chinese firms 
or individuals the entity is defined as Joint Venture (JV). The third option available to foreign 
investors is the Representative Office (RO); the difference between a RO and the other two 
options is that it does not have full legal personality. The RO in fact can only carry on market 
research and PR activities, and cannot in any way directly sell or manufacture goods or 
provide services. 
The sample includes all three of the entities, even though more than half of the companies are 
WFOEs. This is not surprising at all and probably reflects the real composition of the 
population. High flexibility and wide scope of use of the WFOE, without the burden of a local 
investor, make it the preferred choice for many foreign investors. In the sample we can find 
13 WFOEs, 6 ROs and 3 JVs, as shown in figure 12. 
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Figure 11 – Composition of the sample | Legal Entity 
 
Export to china before set-up  
According to the internationalization theorist Johanson and Vahlne (1977), companies 
entering a spatially and culturally distant market usually try to first test the waters and only 
later establish a subsidiary in it. The sample can be divided into companies who have acted 
consistently with the theory and were exporting to China before actually setting up a 
subsidiary, and those who instead were not. The two groups are similar in terms of size, with 
10 companies who used to export before and 12 who didn’t. 
Analysis of drivers  
In order to understand what are the main issues faced by foreign companies in China a list of 
problems that I expected companies to be affect by - or in other words a set of drivers of 
liability of foreignness - was included in the questionnaire sent to companies. The list was 
adapted from the set of issues analyzed by Rossi and Fasulo (2016) and considers different 
aspects of Chinese business environment. Managers were asked to rate from 1 (irrelevant) to 5 
(critical) every driver   according to their experience. The full list of 13 drivers can be found 
in table 5 below. Data collected were then used as a proxy of LOF: the average rating of each 
driver serves as a proxy of the effect the driver has on foreign companies on average 
according to managers’ experience, while the average driver score for each company stands 
for the LOF experienced overall by that firm in particular. 
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Table 5 – List of drivers of LOF submitted in the questionnaire 
N° Drivers of Liability of Foreignness 
1. Intellectual property rights infringement 
2. Chinese protectionism 
3. Geographical distance 
4. Language differences 
5. Cultural differences 
6. Discrimination against foreign brands/companies 
7. Bureaucracy and Licensing requirements 
8. Unclear regulations 
9. Corruption 
10. Difficulties in finding suitable local partners 
11. Work force not qualified 
12. Management-level human resources constraints 
13. Non-Management-level human resources constraints 
IP rights are a recurrent topic when talking about business in China. The country in fact has a 
chronical problem of counterfeit and IP infringements and despite laws are in line with WTO 
requirements, institutions have not been able – or not been willing – to enforce them 
effectively. Moreover the Apple’s case (BBC.com) previously mentioned shows how 
protectionism plays an  important role also, but not only, in IP disputes. Protectionism 
manifests itself indeed with both tariff barriers as high import and custom duties, and non-
tariff barriers e.g. restrictions to foreign investments in specified industries considered 
strategic, favoritism to domestic firms both for public auctions and in the courts, access to 
credit. The discrimination is not only institutional, but it might exist also in consumers 
behavior: although Chinese consumers appreciate and recognize the higher quality and value 
of foreign brands, the rise of renown local firms, together with the transition from quantity to 
quality in the industry sector, is changing public opinion on perceived value. It’s also 
important to remark a growing sentiment of nationalism linked to several international 
disputes – the South China Sea is one example – which could aliment a negative bias towards 
foreign companies, especially western ones. 
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In fact the majority of participating companies are based in Europe or North America. For this 
reason I expected that also geographical distance, and derived complexity of coordination 
with the headquarter, is a potential issue and therefore should be considered. China is not only 
geographically far though, it is also characterized by a unique culture which is very different 
from the western one and that affects heavily also the business environment, as already 
described in chapter 3. The cultural distance translates also in the complexity of finding 
business partners: different business practices and often misunderstandings make finding a 
suitable partner in loco very problematic. In addition Chinese managers are reluctant to trust 
possible partners without before implementing a Guanxi relationship, hampering the chances 
for foreign managers to find a partner. 
Along with the peculiar culture comes also a very different language: the language barrier 
issue is intensified by the fact that many locals do not speak English. This of course reflects 
not only on the relationship with external stakeholders, but also with internal ones. We have 
already mentioned the challenges of human resource management in China, which depend by 
both cultural and institutional factors (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). 
HR management has constraints for both managerial and non-managerial positions. For 
instance finding the right performance indicators and incentives for local managers, that 
sometimes are still influenced by the old planned economy mentality, is not as immediate as 
one could think, given the different expectations and goals from their western counterparts. 
This is valid of course for employees at every level, but somehow more concerning when it 
comes to people who can affect performance of the subsidiary with their decisions. One 
common issue for what concern non-management human resource constraints is for example 
the incredibly high turnover rate affecting several companies in every industry. Employees are 
in general not committed to the company they work for, that they see just as a temporary step 
in their career and are eager to leave for a small salary raise or different job title. The situation 
is even grayer when it comes to migrants from the rural provinces, who often leave without 
notice to move back to their home town. Moreover a big problem is hiring and retaining 
qualified employees, due to the strong competition not only with other foreign firms, but also 
with domestic firms who are increasingly more appealing for locals, thanks to the number of 
those with an international profile. 
As in other developing economies red tape and institutional uncertainty are a main issue in 
China for the reasons we discussed previously in chapter 3, so I expect bureaucracy and 
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unclear regulations to be a major concern for the respondents. These two hurdles are often 
somehow related to corruption through the bad use of Guanxi networks. Corruption issue is so 
common and widespread that the central government and communist party top officials have 
recently engaged in a nationwide anti-corruption campaign, sponsored by the Chinese 
president himself Xi Jinping.  
Data analysis 
Data collected show that the most concerning issue, rated by the 68% of respondents as very 
important or critical, is cultural difference. The same driver retains also the most rated 
position as critical. Four drivers in total are considered by 50% or more of the companies as at 
least very important, as shown in figure 13. Unclear regulations is the second most concerning 
problem behind cultural difference, with 59% of managers considering it very important or 
critical, and bureaucracy and licensing requirements comes right after with 54%. The fourth 
most relevant problem is finding suitable local partners, rated by 50% of the firms at least 
very important. On the other side, we can notice that among the least concerning issues are 
geographical distance and non-management-level HR constraints, both considered by only 14% 
of respondents very important or critical, and discrimination against foreign companies and 
brands (19%). 
Figure 12 – Rating given by respondents to LOF drivers | % of total (2016) 
 
It’s worth to notice a few interesting points shown by the data. First of all it’s no surprise that 
cultural difference takes the first spot as most problematic driver: Chinese culture permeates 
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the business environment and every foreign company needs to get in touch with it. the way of 
doing business in the country is very different from what foreign firms are used to and even if 
they are willing to adapt their practices as suggested by Di Maggio and Powell (1983), 
sometimes they simply can’t fully understand how to do it. It’s unexpected instead that 
language difference, an issue you would imagine to have similar scores to cultural distance, is 
considered not as concerning. Though if we look at figure 14, where scores relative to the 
time of first investment in China are shown, we can notice that the same language difference 
driver is rated at least very important by 50% of the firms: these findings suggest that maybe 
the language barrier is a problem that can be at least partially overcome with time and effort. 
In contrast cultural difference driver appears to be a tougher challenge, since it was the most 
worrisome issue also at the beginning of firms experience, even though the number of 
respondents who rated it critical decreased. 
Institutional uncertainty and bureaucracy, consistently with Luo et Al. (2002) that consider 
China among the most complex countries from this point of view, are among the highest rated 
problems nowadays. It appears instead that they were less relevant at the beginning, like if the 
proliferation and overlapping of laws or regulations, as well as the discretional nature of 
enforcement, got worse over time. 
Figure 13  – Rating given by respondents to LOF drivers | % of total (time of first investment) 
 
Another remarkable finding is that IP law infringements appears to be, surprisingly, not 
among the most concerning issues for companies in the sample, just 32% of them rate it as 
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very important or critical, and at first look the perception of the issue is also improving in 
comparison with the beginning of their Chinese experience, when it was 41% of firms 
considering it very important. But if we check also the lower scores, we can notice that the 
number of companies not worried about it has also decreased, suggesting that probably 
companies are more aware of the issue, even though have found some way to mitigate it. 
Also discrimination against foreign companies, the stigma that according to Vernon (1977) 
affects foreign firms, is not very relevant according to the managers interviewed; actually the 
high percentage (63%) of respondents who consider it irrelevant or not important might 
suggest the effect of a positive bias towards foreign brands, the so called “consumer amity” 
(Baughn & Yaprak, 1993). After all, it’s no news that Chinese consumers like foreign luxury 
brands, and this can be true also in sectors other than fashion. Comparing the data with those 
relative to the time of first investment, we can see how the number of companies considering it 
not important has not changed much and the issue is still one of the less concerning but we 
can notice one thing: among those companies worried about it, the relevance of the problem 
increased. The data could mean that discrimination might be getting worse, but only for a 
restricted group of companies.   
Interesting is also the large gap between management and non-management level HR 
constraints: while the former is considered the fifth most worrisome driver, the latter is one of 
the least concerning according to respondents, and the answers stay quite consistent over time. 
This difference between the two drivers could have different meanings: for instance 
companies probably acknowledge the importance of securing key positions in order to 
achieve a good performance, and therefore perceive the issue more challenging than 
managing other employees. Another reason, partially connected to the one above, is the high 
demand for talented managers, and the increasing competition to hire and retain them. In fact 
non-qualified workforce is rated at least very important by no less than 40% of respondents, 
both now and at the time of first investment. 
Now, if we look at the average score for every driver in table 6, we can see that our previous 
observations are confirmed from the sample average: the highest ratings are, in order, for 
cultural differences (3,77), unclear regulations (3,73), bureaucracy and licensing requirements 
(3,50) and difficulties in finding suitable local partners (3,45). In the table are included also 
average scores of data from the time of first investment ratings, in order to easily compare 
noticeable differences. 
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Probably due to its small size, the sample is characterized by high variance. In fact after a t-
test on the average score for every driver for the two data sets (2016 and time of first 
investment) shows that, with level of significance of 95%, the difference is not significant for 
any driver. Nonetheless, exactly because of the small size of our sample, it would be very 
hard to find some significant difference and therefore it’s still worth to take a closer look to 
the average score of each driver in the two periods, and to its variance. 
Table 6 – List of drivers of LOF | Average score and Variance 
Driver of Liability of Foreignness 
Average 
score 2016 
Variance 
2016 
Average 
score Then 
Variance 
Then 
Cultural differences 3,77 1,71 3,91 1,23 
Unclear regulations 3,73 1,06 3,45 1,12 
Bureaucracy and Licensing requirements 3,50 1,69 3,36 1,48 
Difficulties in finding suitable local partners 3,45 1,97 3,50 1,88 
Language differences 3,23 1,33 3,55 1,40 
Management-level human resources 
constraints 
3,18 1,39 3,14 2,03 
Intellectual Property Right Infringement 3,00 1,62 3,18 1,87 
Work force not qualified 3,00 1,81 3,05 2,24 
Chinese protectionism 2,95 1,66 3,14 1,55 
Corruption 2,86 1,74 3,09 2,18 
Non-Management-level human resources 
constraints 
2,50 1,21 2,59 1,68 
Discrimination against foreign 
brands/companies 
2,45 1,69 2,18 1,20 
Geographical distance 2,41 1,59 2,77 1,61 
Average Driver 3,08 0,37 3,15 0,53 
We can notice first of all that the average driver score (calculated as an average of each 
company’s average driver) has slightly decreased from the time of first investment to 2016. 
Despite the small difference and the subsequent lack of significance it looks like our proxy for 
liability of foreignness has slightly decreased over time.  
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As mentioned above, no significant difference has been found on the single drivers ratings, 
and the variance shown in table 6 highlight that very large differences would be required in 
order to be significant. The same variance though can be useful to understand more about the 
distribution of answers in the sample. Let’s look for instance at the first driver in our list, 
cultural difference: the variance of answers relative to time of first investment is quite smaller, 
suggesting a larger concentration of high scores. The higher variance of 2016 answers shows 
a more even distribution of answers; in other words there’s less agreement on how 
problematic the driver is, and more respondents rated it not important or irrelevant. 
Another interesting point is that, although overall there has been a reduction in liability of 
foreignness perceived, 4 drivers are reported to be more concerning or effective on company 
results, according to respondents. The first 2 drivers are unclear regulations and bureaucracy 
and licensing: the increase also bring them on the second and third positions as most 
concerning issues, overcoming language difference and difficulties in finding suitable partners 
who are in those position, respectively, at time of first investment. The other two drivers are 
management-level HR constraints, whose increase is very small though, and discrimination 
against foreign companies, which is even after the increase the second least concerning 
problem. 
Analysis of groups 
In order to have further insight into the data, I analyzed the drivers rating splitting the sample 
in groups, according to the information collected that we saw at the beginning of this chapter. 
My goal is to understand what could be the variables related to drivers rating, or in other 
words how relevant are the drivers and how strong is liability of foreignness perceived by 
different population groups. Groups were created according to those information that could 
affect the driver strength: age, country, industry, legal entity and previous export activity to 
China. I will proceed now with the analysis of the sample divided according to the mentioned 
5 variables. 
Age of subsidiary 
The age of the subsidiary –  years since its set-up – can be a useful instrument of analysis for 
our sample. Moreover thanks to this division we could check the consistency of the sample 
data with the literature we discussed in previous chapters. Are those companies that operated 
for longer time in the country experiencing lower LOF, as maintained by Zaheer and 
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Mosakowski (1997) and Petersen & Pedersen (2002)? Are these companies improving in their 
efforts of mitigating LOF over time? The sample was split as described before in 3 age groups: 
0 to 1 years (4 companies), 2 to 5 years (13 companies) and more than 5 years (5 companies). 
For every group a separate analysis was conducted and the results are shown in table 7 below. 
Next to each group name the number of firms in the group is shown.  
Table 7 – List of drivers of LOF | Age groups analysis 
Column 1 2 3 
Age groups 0 -1 (4) 2 – 5 (13) 5 + (5) 
DRIVERS 2016 then 2016 then 2016 then 
Intellectual Property Right Infringement 2,50 2,50 2,85 3,23 3,80 3,60 
Chinese protectionism 2,25 2,50 2,85 2,92 3,80 4,20 
Geographical distance 2,00 2,25 2,38 2,54 2,80 3,80 
Language differences 2,75 3,00 3,38 3,46 3,20 4,20 
Cultural differences 3,00 3,75 4,08 3,92 3,60 4,00 
Discrimination against foreign brands/ 
companies 1,75
3
 
1,75 2,153 1,923 3,8012 3,202 
Bureaucracy and Licensing 
requirements 
2,253 2,253 3,69 3,46 4,001 4,001 
Unclear regulations 2,753 2,503 3,69 3,46 4,601 4,201 
Corruption 3,00 3,00 2,77 3,00 3,00 3,40 
Difficulties in finding suitable local 
partners 3,00 3,25 3,38 3,38 4,00 4,00 
Work force not qualified 2,75 2,75 3,08 2,77 3,00 4,00 
Management-level human resources 
constraints 2,75 2,75 3,00 2,77 4,00 4,40 
Non-Management-level human resources 
constraints 2,25 2,25 2,54 2,46 2,60 3,20 
AVERAGE DRIVER 2,5423 2,6523 3,0713 3,0213 3,5512 3,8612 
Legend: Drivers in bold present significant difference. Symbols next to numbers represent significant difference 
with data from the other period e.g. then (*), or the same set of data in column one (1), two (2) or three (3). 
The first thing to be noticed is that there is a clear difference between the average driver of the 
three groups and LOF seems to increase along with the age of subsidiary, for both the 2016 
and time of first investment data set: the older group in fact report the highest score in both 
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cases, followed by the intermediate group. The youngest group present the lowest score in 
both cases as well. I have also run some t-tests on the differences between age groups and 
they all appears to be significant at 95% level of significance, with the exception of one which 
is instead significant at a 90% level. These finding are unexpected and not consistent with the 
most common literature that suggests instead that older firms should suffer less LOF.  
The reasons behind these findings could be several: first of all according to Petersen and 
Pedersen (2002) time itself is not enough to bring knowledge to the firm. If the company put 
no effort in learning or if it is not open to change the longer time spent in the market wouldn’t 
necessarily help to reduce LOF. Moreover we should consider the transitioning nature of the 
market, where frequent environmental changes could frustrate any experience gained. 
Another reason could be that companies who entered later in the market might have been 
already aware of many of the issues they were going to face, thanks to the others experience. 
Failures of other known companies could have been an example for those who came after, 
who therefore engaged in proper preparation programs before to actually start their foreign 
direct investment. The latter idea is supported by the fact that also data relative to the time of 
first investment show a similar score distribution, meaning that companies who entered earlier 
in the market suffered a higher LOF from the beginning. Additionally, when we compare the 
difference of average scores of the same group in different times, we see that the oldest group 
records the largest decline in LOF, which is not significant but suggest that these firms could 
have actually experienced more improvement than younger counterparts, despite the 
transforming external environment.. As it will be discussed later in related sections, no 
connection between age and type of legal entity chosen or previous export activity in China is 
resulting from data available. 
Another reason for the higher LOF experienced by older subsidiaries could be the goal they 
are pursuing in China, or the possible change of related strategy ongoing. For instance 
companies who moved into the market earlier could have done it for reasons different from 
those who did it more recently. Moreover those reason, valid at the time of establishment, 
might no longer be convenient anymore. Higher levels of liability of foreignness reported by 
managers in older firms than could be either directly related to the reason the company is in 
China for, either related to a change of this reason, and the subsequent change in strategy and 
possible challenges involved in it. In order to check whether these theories are supported, at 
least in the sample, we can see table 8 below where a list of reason and related average scores 
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assigned by respondents in each group is shown. Also in this case managers where asked to 
rate the single reason from 1 (irrelevant) to 5 (fundamental). 
Table 8 – List or reasons to operate in China | Average score per age group 
Reason to operate in China 0 -1 2 - 5 5 + 
  2016 then 2016 then 2016 then 
Low labor cost 1,75 1,75 1,77 2,23 1,60 2,80 
Availability of cheap raw materials  2,00 2,00 1,92 1,62 1,80 1,40 
Availability of skilled labor force 1,00 1,00 1,46 1,31 1,80 1,80 
Availability of R&D capabilities 1,25 1,25 1,46 1,38 1,00 1,00 
Logistic advantages 4,25 4,25 2,23 2,00 3,60 3,00 
Fiscal advantages 2,25 2,25 1,85 2,08 1,80 2,20 
Development of a “new” end 
market 
4,25 4,25 4,31 4,38 4,80 4,40 
Competitors are in the market 2,25 2,25 2,46 2,69 4,60 4,60 
Lower constraints as concerns 
environment laws 
1,75 1,75 1,15 1,15 1,40 1,40 
Lower constraints as concern work 
force rights 
1,25 1,25 1,15 1,15 1,60 1,60 
Other 2,00 2,00 1,31 1,31 1,00 1,00 
We can instantly notice that Development of a new market is, and was before, in every age 
group the highest rated reason to be in China. This is not though what we are looking for. 
From the table we can see that older firms rated on average the presence of competitors in the 
market as one of the main reasons to operate in China, while firms in the other two groups do 
not rate this reason as so important. Actually the intermediate group (2 to 5 years) do not 
shown any other very important reason on average. According to respondents in the third and 
youngest group instead, logistic advantages are as important as the development of a new 
market to be in China; the same reason is rated with quite a high score (third highest) also 
from the oldest group. In addition logistic advantages grew in importance from the time of 
first investment for both the intermediate and oldest group, underlining the increasing 
relevance of China as a logistic hub in the globalized economy. Since there are, at least 
partially, different reasons to operate in China in the three groups, LOF could be affected also 
by this aspect.  
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For what concern instead the change of importance of reasons to operate in the market, as 
expected there is no change in scores of the youngest group, which represent companies who 
have just set-up their subsidiary. The other two groups instead appear to be increasingly 
changing their strategy compared to what it was at the time of first investment. While several 
strategies seem to be changing just a little in the intermediate group, where the largest change 
in the average score is a reduction in low labor costs reason ( not significant though), in the 
oldest group only five strategies have a different score from the time of first investment, but 
these changes are larger, especially for what concern the low labor costs reason. The total net 
change – in absolute value – is indeed higher for the 2 to 5 years group and even higher for 
oldest group. This is no surprise considering that a possible change in strategy is to be 
expected over time, but nonetheless these changes could give origin to additional liability of 
foreignness. 
If we look back at table 7, we can see that some drivers have a larger variation between 
groups, and it’s worth to look deeper into them. Consistently with the average driver data, 
many drivers appear to be increasingly more concerning for older firms and this is valid also 
for answers relative to the time of first investment. Respondents in the 5 or more years group 
rate several issues as more worrisome than the intermediate group, even though in some cases 
is the younger group to be ahead. Compared instead to the 0 to 1 years group, ratings of the 
oldest group are definitely higher. T-tests conducted on single drivers confirm that some 
differences are significant. 
In particular firms in the oldest group (more than 5 years) rate discrimination against foreign 
companies and brand more concerning compared to the other two groups with a level of 
significance of 95%; the difference is smaller and not significant between the two younger 
groups. The stronger effect of discrimination on companies with more than 5 years of 
experience, as perceived by managers, might be due to the aforementioned change of strategy 
or goals that these companies appears to be undergoing. These changes could bring the 
subsidiary in touch with new players and situations in the market for what they cannot count 
on the established customer or supplier base and the experience they already have. These 
findings, and the fact that in every group the score is stable or increasing, are consistent with 
what Eden and Miller (2004) suggest: costs resulting from discriminatory behavior are not 
likely to decrease over time.  
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Both the drivers unclear regulations and bureaucracy and licensing requirements were rated 
higher (with significance of 95%) from respondents in the oldest group. In this case though 
the difference is significant only with the 0 to 1 years group, not with the intermediate. This is 
due probably because of the high variance characterizing the intermediate group. Moreover 
for what concern bureaucracy, the two oldest groups have similar average rating. How to 
explain the fact that older firms are suffering more LOF due to unclear regulations or 
bureaucracy, when you would expect instead the opposite, consistently with the previously 
discussed literature? A possible reason could be that latest entrants are more prepared to this 
uncertainty. In fact if we look at answers relative to the time of first investment, we instantly 
notice that rating were higher for the same groups of firms also at the beginning of their 
experience, suggesting that the issue was probably very concerning from the beginning. We 
can also notice that the two drivers, for every group, are a rising concern compared to when 
companies moved into the market: both their rating in fact increased over time, probably due 
to the economic reforms ongoing which of course affect the whole population. 
It’s interesting to notice that corruption, non-qualified workforce and constraints on non-
managerial human resources were rated with the same level of criticality between the three 
groups: these three problems therefore look to be not dependent on the years of activity, and 
are maybe related to other variables. One more note is worth on cultural distance driver, 
which is reported as more concerning from respondents in the intermediate group; very high 
variance levels in both the 0 to 1 years and more than 5 years groups make very hard to 
interpret this finding though. Other than the above few exceptions, all the other drivers not 
mentioned in this section follow a common path: increasingly more concerning for older 
groups, but no significant difference was found. 
Country of origin 
The country of origin is an interesting classification and can be useful to check whether the 
available sample reflects some of the theories discussed before. Moeller et Al. (2013) for 
instance maintain that nationality of the company itself could be a driver of liability of 
foreignness since it could influence consumers’ response to firms’ products or brand and can 
have a significant impact on quality perception. In order to analyze the sample I split it in two 
groups, one including Italian companies (12 in total) and one including companies form all 
the other countries (10 firms, the full list can be found at the beginning of this chapter). I am 
aware that this is not an ideal division because of the variety characterizing the residual group, 
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but I proceeded in this way because there were not enough firms from another single country 
to be put in a group by themselves. In this way we can at least compare answers from 
managers in Italian companies as compared to others. 
Table 9 – List of drivers of LOF | Country groups analysis  
Column 1 2 
Country groups ITALIAN (12) OTHERS (10) 
DRIVERS 2016 then 2016 then 
Intellectual Property Right Infringement 3,08 3,08 2,90 3,30 
Chinese protectionism 2,502 2,582 3,501 3,801 
Geographical distance 2,58 2,75 2,20 2,80 
Language differences 3,00 3,50 3,50 3,60 
Cultural differences 3,58 3,92 4,00 3,90 
Discrimination against foreign brands/companies 2,17 2,08 2,80 2,30 
Bureaucracy and Licensing requirements 3,25 3,33 3,80 3,40 
Unclear regulations 3,58 3,50 3,90 3,40 
Corruption 2,92 3,17 2,80 3,00 
Difficulties in finding suitable local partners 4,002 4,082 2,801 2,801 
Work force not qualified 2,75 3,17 3,30 2,90 
Management-level human resources constraints 2,83 3,00 3,60 3,30 
Non-Management-level human resources constraints 2,33 2,33 2,70 2,90 
AVERAGE DRIVER 2,97 3,12 3,22 3,18 
Legend: Drivers in bold present significant difference. Symbols next to numbers represent significant difference 
with data from the other period e.g. then (*), or the same set of data in column one (1), two (2). 
From a first look to table 9, where results of the analysis conducted are shown, seems like 
countries from the group Others report overall a slightly higher LOF overall compared to 
Italian firms, even though the difference is not significant. Although Italian respondents 
declared a small decrease of the average rating over time, according to managers in the group 
Others the average score is substantially unchanged from the time of first investment. The 
possible reason of these different behaviors are to be searched in the single driver scores: 
Italian companies record a small but general reduction for most of the drivers; in Other’s 
group instead  differences are bigger, but in both directions. Considering the variety 
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characterizing the latter group, which includes enterprises from no less than 5 countries, it’s 
not surprising that differences are so inconsistent.  
Since there are no significant differences in the overall score, we should look deeper into 
single drivers rankings. Finding a suitable local partner is one of the most concerning issues 
according to managers in the Italian group, and it was a main problem in the past as well. The 
score assigned to this driver is not as high in the group Others though, and in fact I found 
significant (95% level) difference for both the time frames. The reason of this clear difference 
could be a different way of doing business, and looking for business partners, between groups; 
findings suggest that Italian companies could be used to practices not compatible with 
domestic players’ ones. 
Another significant difference (95%) is reported for the driver Chinese protectionism. In this 
case though the problem seems to be more concerning for Others companies than for Italians. 
Moreover the rating has declined in time for both the groups, even though the decrease is 
more noticeable in Others. Higher level of protectionism experienced by companies in Others 
could be caused by several things, and it’s not easy to determine one considering that the 
group includes companies from different countries. We can  only observe that somehow 
appears like Italian companies are less concerned by this driver of LOF.  
The other drivers have no significant difference between groups, but two of them are worth to 
be briefly mentioned: discrimination against foreign companies and brands and management-
level HR constraints. In both cases respondents in group Others rate higher scores for these 
problems compared to Italians. For what concern discrimination, a lower score for Italians 
could be explained with what Moeller et Al. (2013) say, and the findings might suggest that 
Italian companies or brands could “look better” in the eyes of Chinese public just because of 
their nationality. Constraints in HR management are considered to be a growing problem 
among Others respondents, while it seems to be decreasing for Italian companies; the 
combined effect is a clear higher rating recorded by the former in 2016 data set. This could be 
related to the appear-to-be smaller cultural and language difference that Italian companies 
declare compared to others, consistently with Newman and Nollen (1996) findings.  
Industry  
Liability of foreignness, or at least some of its drivers, can often be related to the industry 
where a company is operating. This is true especially in China, a country which is undergoing 
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a massive transition to an advanced economy, one based on services and high-tech and above 
all on internal consumption. Together with the economic transition comes an institutional 
transformation: central and local governments are updating laws and regulations to keep up 
with the quick industry transition and many sectors, especially the newest ones, are involved. 
Moreover some industries are highly regulated or even restricted. If we add also that some 
sectors are now struggling while others are thriving, it’s easy to understand why the industry 
where a foreign company operates can really change the level of liability of foreignness 
perceived. 
The sample was split into three groups in order to conduct my analysis. These groups were 
thought based on the expected similar external condition they face now in the market: Low-
tech industry and primary sector (8 companies), High-tech and medium-tech industries (8 
companies) and service sector (6 companies). Table 10 below highlights the main point of the 
analysis. The overall indicator of LOF, the average driver, tells us already something 
interesting: High and medium tech industries appear to be affected more heavily by liability 
of foreignness, and the difference with Low-tech and primary is even significant (95% level). 
Companies in the service sector are overall slightly less affected than High and medium tech 
enterprises, they are instead definitely more concerned than firms in low-tech and primary, 
but the difference was significant with a 95% level only at the time of first investment. 
Considering that high and medium tech and service industries are those undergoing radical 
changes, the fact that companies in low-tech industry are perceiving less Liability of 
foreignness is not surprising. Low-tech and primary sectors although are now going through 
an economic slowdown in China, at least compared to the other groups, so they should also be 
affected. The reason is probably that the slowdown is involving both foreign and domestic 
players, not influencing therefore the level of liability of foreignness. 
After the analysis of single drivers, many interesting information can be discussed. Even 
though only in two cases I have found significant difference – discrimination against foreign 
brands and companies and geographical distance – almost every problem is worth a comment. 
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Table 10 – List of drivers of LOF | Industry groups analysis 
Column 1 2 3 
Industry groups 
SERVICE (6) HIGH/MED 
TECH (8) 
LOW TECH 
(8) 
DRIVERS 2016 then 2016 then 2016 then 
Intellectual Property Right Infringement 2,33 2,83 3,50 3,13 3,00 3,50 
Chinese protectionism 3,17 3,83 3,50 3,25 2,25 2,50 
Geographical distance 2,33 2,67 3,133 3,503 1,752 2,132 
Language differences 3,00 3,33 3,50 4,13 3,13 3,13 
Cultural differences 3,83 3,83 3,50 4,00 4,00 3,88 
Discrimination against foreign brands/ 
companies 2,33 2,00 3,38
3
 2,883 1,632 1,632 
Bureaucracy and Licensing requirements 4,00 4,17 3,25 3,13 3,38 3,00 
Unclear regulations 4,17 4,00 3,63 3,38 3,50 3,13 
Corruption 3,17 3,67 3,00 3,13 2,50 2,63 
Difficulties in finding suitable local 
partners 3,17 3,33 4,00 3,88 3,13 3,25 
Work force not qualified 2,67 3,00 3,00 3,25 3,25 2,88 
Management-level human resources 
constraints 3,50 3,33 3,38 3,63 2,75 2,50 
Non-Management-level human resources 
constraints 2,83 3,00 2,63 2,75 2,13 2,13 
AVERAGE DRIVER 3,12 3,313 3,343 3,383 2,802 2,7923 
Legend: Drivers in bold present significant difference. Symbols next to numbers represent significant difference 
with data from the other period e.g. then (*), or the same set of data in column one (1), two (2) or three (3). 
Let’s first take into consideration those drivers where a 95% level significant difference has 
been reported: geographical distance is considered more concerning by respondents in the 
high and medium tech industries compared to the low-tech and primary industry, then and 
now. The service sector appears to consider the issue slightly more worrisome than the latter, 
but no significant difference was found with neither. The fact that geographical distance is 
much more a problem for the high and medium tech managers could suggest the need for 
more investor control and higher level of coordination in advanced and complex processes. 
The need for control is easily understandable if we consider that for these companies a loss of 
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knowhow could be definitely more concerning than for companies in other groups. In addition 
we should keep in mind that in situations where more complex processes are involved the 
interactions between actors are reciprocal and geographical distance (and in this case also 
time zone differences) can negatively affect coordination. 
Discrimination against foreign companies and brands are rated differently in the three groups 
although it doesn’t seems to be one of the biggest concerns: following the same course of 
geographical distance, firms in high and medium tech seems to experience more 
discrimination, with a significant difference (95%) compared to low-tech and primary sector 
companies; also for this driver the rating among service companies is lower than high and 
medium tech but higher than low tech and primary, and no significant difference was found 
for it. Discrimination towards high and medium tech firms is not intuitive: the reason behind 
in fact could be the growth of the new value-added Chinese industry, the same which is 
supposed to substitute the low quality mass industry as powerhouse of Chinese economy. 
These new local companies in the high tech sector could have attracted the attention of 
Chinese customers, increasing the effect of discrimination (the rating is actually increasing 
from the time of first investment). The same thing is not valid for low tech industry, where the 
majority of domestic players still focus on price competition. 
As just mentioned also those driver where no significant difference was found between the 
groups can give us some insight on the most concerning issues. For instance looks like service 
firms suffer less LOF due to IP law infringements compared to other groups, and the lack of 
significance is maybe caused by high variance. This output makes sense in fact service 
companies are in general less concerned about trademarks and patents infringement. Also the 
shift to a more advanced industry in the country is maybe represented by an increase of rating 
in high and medium tech and decrease in low tech and primary group since the time of first 
investment. The issue of patents and trademark maybe reflects also on the difficulty to find a 
suitable partner, which is rated overall even as more concerning: high and medium tech group 
although report a higher score compared to the other two group, suggesting that maybe 
finding a trustworthy partner is more difficult when it comes to dealing with patents and 
knowhow in general. 
Protectionism is more concerning for high and medium tech managers, followed by 
respondents in the service group. These findings were to be expected given the already 
discussed non-tariff barriers existing strategic sectors. Since the Chinese government is 
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pushing towards a necessary modernization of industry and economy in general, these 
industries are subject to restrictions and stricter control and therefore should suffer higher 
levels of LOF.  
Both bureaucracy and unclear regulation seems to be more concerning for the service industry, 
even though not significantly. Maybe the reason behind these results is the nature of the 
industry: these firms need more than other groups simpler rules to operate efficiently and slow 
bureaucracy and uncertain environment affect them more. 
When we look instead at HR related issues, we can see that both management and non-
management level constraints are considered to be more worrisome in the service and high 
and medium tech industries. No surprise that more advanced industries require more effort for 
an effective HR management. Nonetheless looks like when it comes to finding qualified 
workforce is more difficult or concerning for respondents in the low tech and primary group, 
according to who the issue is also getting worse from the time of first investment in contrast 
with the other two groups. 
Legal entity  
The choice of legal entity to establish a subsidiary in China mostly depends on the need that a 
company has: for example if the goal is market research, development of a new market or 
nurturing the relationship with local partners a Representative office should be enough. If 
instead a foreign enterprise wants to sell or manufacture goods or provide services directly 
with the subsidiary itself, a bigger investment in a WFOE or JV is required. In our sample we 
have all three of them, in particular 6 ROs, 13 WFOEs and 3 JVs. The small number of JVs in 
the sample is probably representative of the entire population. WFOEs in fact are much more 
common among foreign investors thanks to the simpler procedure of establishment and the 
lack of need for a local partner. 
When we look at the results of the analysis in table 11 we instantly realize that there is no 
noticeable difference between the average driver rating of different groups. It’s necessary to 
check more detailed data to collect some useful information. Some drivers in fact were found 
to be significantly (95%) different among groups.  
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Table 11 – List of drivers of LOF | Legal entity groups analysis 
Column 1 2 3 
Legal entity groups RO (6) WFOE (13) JV (3) 
DRIVERS 2016 then 2016 then 2016 then 
Intellectual Property Right Infringement 3,17 3,50 3,00 2,69 2,67 4,67 
Chinese protectionism 2,67 2,67 3,15 3,23 2,67 3,67 
Geographical distance 3,333 3,33 2,15 2,54 1,671 2,67 
Language differences 3,832 3,83 2,7713 3,46 4,002 3,33 
Cultural differences 4,33 4,67 3,54 3,77 3,67 3,00 
Discrimination against foreign brands/ 
companies 2,50 2,00 2,54 2,31 2,00 2,00 
Bureaucracy and Licensing requirements 4,00 3,67 3,23 3,23 3,67 3,33 
Unclear regulations 3,33 3,50 3,85 3,38 4,00 3,67 
Corruption 2,17 2,50 3,15 3,15 3,00 4,00 
Difficulties in finding suitable local 
partners 4,17
3
 4,333 3,46 3,46 2,001 2,001 
Work force not qualified 2,67 2,83 3,08 3,23 3,33 2,67 
Management-level human resources 
constraints 2,83 3,00 3,15 3,23 4,00 3,00 
Non-Management-level human resources 
constraints 2,33 2,50 2,54 2,54 2,67 3,00 
AVERAGE DRIVER 3,18 3,26 3,05 3,09 3,03 3,15 
Legend: Drivers in bold present significant difference. Symbols next to numbers represent significant difference 
with data from the other period e.g. then (*), or the same set of data in column one (1), two (2) or three (3). 
The most intuitive finding is the huge gap between the low score assigned to difficulties in 
finding local partners by JV managers, compared to the rather high score given by managers 
in the other two groups. JVs have, by definition, already found a local partner and we couldn’t 
expect any different result. Also the lower concern shown by respondents from JV group in 
regard of discrimination against foreign firms, despite the difference is not significant, is 
understandable. The JV is in fact partially owned by locals, and therefore is maybe considered 
as less foreign by the public. 
The scores assigned to the language difference issue follow an interesting path: according to 
both RO’s and JV’s respondents on average this problem is more concerning than for 
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companies in the WFOEs group – significant difference at 95% level for ROs and 90% level 
for JVs. The reason behind it could be different for the two cases: rep. offices are less 
integrated in general with the local market, and often they do not employ local staff, thus they 
could perceive the language distance as a bigger problem compared to other companies. JVs 
instead are very integrated and the language barrier is probably experienced on a daily basis, 
bringing along higher level of LOF.  
The third driver I have found a significant difference between groups for is geographical 
distance: ROs seem to be more concerned about it compared to both WFOEs and JVs (even 
though the difference is significant only for JV group). This data suggest that probably the 
level of autonomy  is related to the level of geographical distance perceived. A representative 
office in fact is highly dependent on the parent companies decisions, requiring more 
communication. WFOEs and JVs are in general more autonomous and therefore the need for 
coordination is lower. The scores assigned to cultural differences are consistent with literature 
(Di Maggio & Powell, 1983; Mezias, 2002), even if in this case there is no significant 
difference in the sample. An higher degree of integration boost the adaptation to the local 
environment and increase legitimacy. To be noticed moreover that for joint ventures cultural 
differences became a more concerning problem over time. This detail makes me think that 
maybe foreign managers of JVs, because of the partnership they have already implemented, 
expect not to experience a big cultural shock, but later realize that the joint venture itself is 
not enough to overcome LOF stemming from cultural differences.  
When it comes to IP rights infringements, respondents from the JV group seems to be less 
worried compared to those in other groups. It was instead the opposite at the time of first 
investment, when the issue was rated extremely high by the same group. The possible reason 
is that given their close contact with the local partner foreign firms where very concerned 
about the problem. With time they instead realized that a local partner bring no harness to the 
IP rights, and it’s probably useful to reduce the related danger. 
Unclear regulation and Corruption are both rated as less concerning in the RO group, while 
the score is similar for WFOEs and JVs. We can imagine that a rep. office, due to its limited 
scope of operations, is on one side subject to fewer laws and regulations, on the other side less 
involved in the relationship with government officials. Also HR constraints for managerial 
staff are a smaller concern for ROs. This of course has nothing to do with the relationship 
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with authorities, but it might have with the complexity of operations. This is somehow 
confirmed by the higher rating given to the same issue by respondents in the JV group and it 
is also not so unexpected: probably with the increase of operations complexity dealing with 
local managers is more critical.  
Export to China before establishment of subsidiary 
The last variable I examined in relation to the list of drivers of liability of foreignness is the 
previous export activity to China, in other words whether or not companies engaged in any 
export operation to  China before to step in the market with an FDI. According to literature 
associated with the Uppsala model a step-by-step entrance strategy can reduce the 
unfamiliarity with the foreign market and therefore reduce liability of foreignness. Also 
Hymer (1960) suggested that indirect investments are less risky and more suitable to approach 
a new market. The sample was divided then in two quite even group Export (10 firms) and No 
export (12 firms). Unlike what we would expect and more in line with Denk et Al. (2012) and 
Zaheer (2002) views, table 12 here below show that the average driver, proxy of liability of 
foreignness, present a basically equal score in the two groups, and no clear changes are 
noticeable from the time of first investment. We need therefore to analyze in detail the drivers 
and see if some useful information are retrievable. 
At a first look we understand why the overall level of liability of foreignness seems to be the 
same between the two groups: several driver were rated differently from respondents in the 
two groups, and in some cases the difference is even significant (at a 95% or 90% level), but 
some issues are more concerning for companies who exported in China before, while some 
others are more problematic for who didn’t. the overall effect is then of virtual equality in the 
LOF perceived. 
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Table 12 – List of drivers of LOF | Export to China before groups analysis 
Column 1 2 
Export to china before groups 
EXPORT (10) NO EXPORT 
(12) 
DRIVERS 2016 then 2016 then 
Intellectual Property Right Infringement 3,10 3,60 2,92 2,83 
Chinese protectionism 2,402 2,80 3,421 3,42 
Geographical distance 3,002 3,402 1,921 2,251 
Language differences 3,802 3,80 2,751 3,33 
Cultural differences 4,10 3,70 3,50 4,08 
Discrimination against foreign brands/companies 2,40 2,20 2,50 2,17 
Bureaucracy and Licensing requirements 3,60 3,50 3,42 3,25 
Unclear regulations 3,80 3,50 3,67 3,42 
Corruption 2,302 2,502 3,331 3,581 
Difficulties in finding suitable local partners 3,50 3,60 3,42 3,42 
Work force not qualified 2,70 2,70 3,25 3,33 
Management-level human resources constraints 3,00 2,60 3,33 3,58 
Non-Management-level human resources 
constraints 
2,002 2,002 2,921 3,081 
AVERAGE DRIVER 3,05 3,07 3,10 3,21 
Legend: Drivers in bold present significant difference. Symbols next to numbers represent significant difference 
with data from the other period e.g. then (*), or the same set of data in column one (1), two (2). 
Starting from drivers who are rated as more concerning by the group who didn’t engage in 
any export activity before, as suggested by the literature, we find that protectionism has a 
significantly (90%) higher score according to the No export group. Additionally over time 
firms who exported before also managed to apparently reduce the impact of the driver, while 
the other group didn’t. Also the effect of corruption looks to be lower on companies who used 
to export before, with a level of significance of 90%. A possible explanation for both these 
drivers is that thanks to their previous export activity, companies already had implemented a 
group of local connections, probably using Guanxi, to reduce the effect of the two drivers and 
mitigate related LOF.    
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From an HR point of view, Export group appears to have easier life with both managerial and 
non-managerial staff. For what concern non-management level constraints, difference with 
No export group is even significant (95%). For the latter actually, dealing with non-
managerial staff is almost as difficult as dealing with managers. It’s possible that a previous 
experience could have given some knowledge of the market HR practices, even if only partial, 
maybe tapping local partners. 
When we check instead the other side of the coin we see that both cultural and language 
difference and geographical distance are rated as more concerning from those companies who 
were exporting to China before the FDI. Considering then that two of them are also 
significantly different (both geographical distance and language differences at a 95% level), 
the findings are highly unexpected. For what concern cultural differences it’s worth to notice 
that respondents’ perception changed over time: seems like the Export group is perceiving as 
more problematic if compared to the time of first investment, while managers in the No export 
group think on average that the problem got better. The reason behind this opposite 
development could be found in the concept of perceived familiarity (Petersen & Pedersen, 
2002). Companies in the Export group perceived to be familiar with the market at the time of 
first investment and didn’t engage in much preparation, to find themselves stunned by a higher 
cultural difference than expected. Firms in the other group instead put a lot of effort before the 
FDI in order to be prepare, expecting very high cultural difference levels, and after an initial 
shock managed to mitigate the LOF. 
It’s hard to find a reason behind the scores assigned to language differences and geographical 
distance in this case: higher ratings from the export groups in fact were not expected for these 
two drivers, and are in contrast with the analyzed literature. A possible explanation could be 
the overconfidence these companies approached the FDI with, that brought them to 
underestimate the issue and be less prepared in comparison with  companies who didn’t 
export before who instead prepare themselves. An alternative view could be instead that the 
knowledge accumulated give these companies an insight into the market, letting them 
perceive higher LOF under these two aspects, or o the other side are companies who didn’t 
export before to have undervalued these issues. 
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Conclusion 
Thanks to my job in China I found myself in the position to contact several managers of 
companies that are currently active in the country, more specifically in Shanghai, and have a 
first-hand insight into the dynamics of Liability of Foreignness affecting companies here. A 
questionnaire then was sent out to several firms to interrogate managers on their experience 
about the business environment. The main analysis was conducted on a list of common issues 
faced by foreign companies, issues that are supposed to be then drivers of LOF. These drivers 
were then analyzed in relation to 5 population characteristics based on which the sample was 
split. As mentioned earlier the sample collected is smaller than expected and my findings are 
not to be considered definitive, but they can still trigger some interesting reasoning about the 
reflection of LOF theories on empirical data. 
The analysis of drivers revealed that the most concerning issues according to respondents are 
cultural distance, unclear regulations and bureaucracy and licensing requirements. As 
already mentioned Chinese culture is very peculiar and deeply rooted also in the way of doing 
business therefore foreign companies, especially western firms like the majority of those who 
are in the sample, are all hit by a cultural shock. We have also discussed how the institutional 
framework is uncertain and how laws and regulations are in constant evolution and sometimes 
enforced inconsistently, making China a very complex market overall (Luo et Al., 2002). It’s 
not surprising that almost every respondent confirmed the use – or at least the effort to 
implement – Guanxi connections in order to integrate better with business environment and 
compensate for the lack of established formal institutions (Peng, 2005).  
In order to better understand the dynamics of LOF drivers the sample was split into groups 
formed on the basis of variables explained before, which were then analyzed singularly and 
compared. The first analysis conducted was on 3 age groups, where age stands for the number 
of years from the establishment of the subsidiary until now. The findings reveal a picture 
which seems to be very different from the expectations: while literature (Zaheer and 
Mosakowski, 1997; Petersen & Pedersen, 2002) and common sense suggest that older firms 
would be less affected by liability of foreignness thanks to their direct experience in the 
market, according to data collected, managers of older companies declare higher difficulties 
in several aspects, and the overall result is an apparent higher level of LOF for older firms.  
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The unexpected results can be due to multiple reasons linked to the type of learning 
engagement (Petersen & Pedersen, 2002) or to the goals pursued by the company in China. 
Older companies for example might have not engaged in pre-entry learning and have been hit 
by a stronger cultural shock compared to younger ones, which instead after learning from 
others previous experience engaged also in pre-entry preparation, reducing the impact of LOF. 
Despite older companies could have started at a disadvantage, why are they still perceiving 
levels of LOF so high after several years? The answer to this question is probably in the 
transitioning nature of the market: the continuous evolution of market conditions could have 
prevented companies to effectively acquire useful knowledge and experience, and therefore 
do not reduce LOF effects. On the other side older companies could perceive higher level of 
LOF because of the goals they pursued in the market at the time of their first investment. The 
change in market conditions could have hampered their operations and forced subsidiaries to 
reinvent themselves. Respondents in older firms for example report a decreasing importance 
of low labor costs and a growing importance of logistic advantages as reasons to stay in China; 
according to the newest companies logistic advantages are one of the top 2 reasons to be there.  
Since Moeller et Al. (2013) suggest that the country of origin could influence the level of 
LOF, influencing public opinion about the company image as well as about the services or 
products it provides, the sample was divided into two groups, distinguishing between Italian 
companies and all the others. From the results seems like Italian companies suffer slightly 
lower levels of liability of foreignness overall, but the difference is so small that is worth to 
look deeper into single drivers. Some issues appear to be more concerning for respondents in 
Italian firms, while others follow an opposite path. Worth to be mentioned are difficulties in 
finding a suitable partner, considered significantly more concerning by Italian companies. The 
possible reason could be that Italian managers in particular are used to very different practices 
to those commonly used in China, practices that are instead more similar to those of other 
countries. For what concern protectionism instead, Italian companies apparently feel less 
concerned about the problem; even though we cannot be sure, the results suggest a possible 
positive bias towards Italian firms, reflecting in lower level of LOF perceived, as reported by 
respondents.   
Liability of foreignness and some of its drivers can change between different industries, 
especially when some of them are more regulated or are quickly changing, like in China. To 
see how LOF effects change between sectors the sample was divided into three groups: 
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Service sector, high and medium tech industry, low tech industry. From a first analysis of the 
average driver, representing the overall LOF perceived, it appears that companies in the high 
and medium tech and in the service industries are more affected by liability of foreignness. 
These findings are not surprising considering that these two groups represent those industries 
undergoing the most radical changes, and therefore subject to higher levels of uncertainty.  
We can find other expected results also in the analysis of single drivers. In particular the 
significant difference in the score of geographical distance reveals that firms in the high and 
medium tech industry look to be, as previously described, more concerned over the needs for 
coordination and parent organizational control. Discrimination against foreign firms is also 
considered more concerning by high and medium tech group respondents. The possible 
explanation lies in the growth of new domestic companies focusing on high-end markets in 
the high and medium tech industries. These local competitors are offering value-added 
products and are gaining reputation among Chinese consumers, to the detriment of foreign 
enterprises. 
The decision over the type of legal entity chosen depends on the needs of a company: 
different legal entities have advantages and disadvantages, that we have already discussed, 
and can be affected in different ways by drivers of liability of foreignness. As expected, joint 
ventures consider the issue of finding a local partner not as concerning as it is for other groups, 
indeed these companies have already found at least one by definition. Geographical distance 
is a bigger concern for representative offices, compared to the other two groups: probably the 
direct dependence of this type of entity from the parent company increase the need for 
coordination and therefore the perceived distance. Language barriers apparently manifest 
themselves in two different ways: they are a main issue for ROs that are as mentioned above 
less integrated with the local environment, and often do not employ local staff. Joint ventures 
on the other side are constantly in contact with their Chinese partner so, even though external 
language differences are lower, internal communication barriers are a daily concern.  
Companies who engaged in export activities to China before to enter with an FDI in the 
country are supposed, according to theories associated with the Uppsala model, to suffer less 
LOF thanks to the experience and the market-specific knowledge gained. Our data although 
show a different picture: there is no apparent difference in the LOF perceived between the 
group of companies who used to export and the group who didn’t, consistently with Denk et 
Al. (2012) and Zaheer (2002). Protectionism and corruption are the two main drivers that No 
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export group rated as more concerning compared to the other. Lower level of corruption and 
protectionism perceived are understandable given the chance that a local network of contacts 
has already been established during the export activities. Despite the two drivers are not 
directly related to the network of relationships, Guanxi can be useful to mitigate the effects of 
them, and therefore to reduce LOF. Of course the implementation of connections is also 
useful to tap general knowledge about the market even if it can be only partial. This 
knowledge could be enough to make companies well aware of the risks in the market, this 
might be a reason why firms who exported before rate geographical distance and language 
distance more concerning compared to the other group. 
The lack of a numerous observations didn’t allow me to run a full analysis on the data 
collected. Moreover not enough subsidiary performance data were provided by managers, 
neither sufficient information about the strategies implemeted. Also the chances to run a 
meaningful regression analysis were hampered by the small size of the sample. Nevertheless 
the simple analysis of ratings given to drivers of liability of foreignness and their influence on 
firm’s operation, as well as the relation between what are the most relevant issues faced and 
other characteristics of the subsidiary itself – age, country of origin, industry, type of legal 
entity chosen, export activity before the FDI – gave us a useful insight into how empirical 
data reflect the theories previously discussed and their suggestions.  
In conclusion, as already mentioned, my findings cannot, and don’t want to, give final 
answers to how the effect of liability of foreignness influences foreign companies strategy or 
vice-versa, neither can provide definitive results on the causes of liability of foreignness. My 
goal is to provide empirical evidence that liability of foreignness is a complex concept, its 
causes and effects depend on the situation in which the company is and on the company 
characteristics themselves as shown by the results of my analysis previously discussed.  
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YOUR COMPANY 
Respondent’s position in the Company 
Director/functional leader of the department (HR director, finance director, sales director, etc) ☐ 
Director of the government relations or public relations department ☐ 
Director of Chinese operations ☐ 
Senior-level country manager (CEO, VP, GM, managing director) ☐ 
Other (consultant, lawyer, advisor, etc) please  specify       ☐ 
The primary industry in which the firm is engaged 
Aircraft ☐ Leather and Shoes ☐ 
Pharmaceuticals ☐ Agriculture ☐ 
Electronics and computing machines ☐ Food and Beverages ☐ 
Medical instruments ☐ Retail, distribution and Logistics ☐ 
Electrical machinery and machine tools ☐ Information technology and information services ☐ 
Automotive and transportation equipment ☐ Reseach and Educational Services ☐ 
Mechanics ☐ Advertising and marketing ☐ 
Chemicals (no Pharmaceuticals) ☐ Financial services ☐ 
Rubber and plastic products ☐ Health Care ☐ 
Mineral products, petroleum products and basic metals ☐ Insurance and Bank ☐ 
Textile and apparel ☐ Real Estate and other firm services ☐ 
Home Furniture ☐ Other (please specify)        ☐ 
In which of the following countries did the company sell its product/services in 2015. Please also indicate 
whether sales are decreasing, stable or increasing compared to 2014. 
Area 2015 % of export Decreased Stable Increased 
Europe       ☐ ☐ ☐ 
North America       ☐ ☐ ☐ 
South and central America        ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Middle East       ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Africa       ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Asia  (excluding China)       ☐ ☐ ☐ 
China       ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Australia and Oceania       ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Total Exports 100%    
In what areas does the firm have subsidiaries? Please indicate the number of active subsidiaries in the 
past 3 years for each of the following geographic areas.  Please also remark the activities conducted by 
the subsidiaries in the area. 
Area 2015 Commercial Sourcing R&D Manufacturing Logistic After 
sale 
Europe       ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
North America       ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
South and central America       ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Middle East       ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Africa       ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Asia  (excluding China)       ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
China       ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Australia and Oceania       ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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2014 Commercial Sourcing R&D Manufacturing Logistic After 
sale 
Europe       ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
North America       ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
South and central America       ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Middle East       ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Africa       ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Asia  (excluding China)       ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
China       ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Australia and Oceania       ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
2013 Commercial Sourcing R&D Manufacturing Logistic After 
sale 
Europe       ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
North America       ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
South and central America       ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Middle East       ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Africa       ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Asia  (excluding China)       ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
China       ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Australia and Oceania       ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
CHINA OPERATIONS 
Year in which the Chinese subsidiary was founded          
Before its first investment in China, did the firm export to China?  yes ☐ no ☐ 
Which of the following legal entities is your company in China?  
Legal entity  
Wholly foreign-owned enterprise (WFOE) ☐ 
Representative office ☐ 
Joint venture ☐ 
Distribution of shareholder equity of the WFOE (Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprise) 
Shareholder Type of shareholder* % of equity Is the shareholder active in firm 
management? 
shareholder 1 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐       yes ☐ no ☐ 
shareholder 2 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐       yes ☐ no ☐ 
shareholder 3 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐       yes ☐ no ☐ 
Other (if any) 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐       yes ☐ no ☐ 
 
 100%  
*1 foreign resident individual, 2 Chinese resident individual, 3 Chinese firm, 4 foreign firm, 5 bank or financial 
institution 
How many employees does your company have in China now? How many did it have at the end of the 
first year of activity in the country?  
 2016 First year 
Investor’s Country Expatriates             
Local Chinese             
Third Country Expatriates             
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Revenues and margins of the WFOE in the past three years, in Euros  
 2016 (forecast) 2015 2014 
Revenues                    
Net Operating Profit (EBIT))                    
Please indicate the proportion of R&D / Sales expenses out of revenues for your Chinese subsidiary  
 2016 (forecast) 2015 2014 
Proportion invested in R&D                   
Proportion invested in Sales and Marketing                   
Did the company use third party assistance for its entry in Chinese market? Please specify which and 
rate its degree of effectiveness in helping the company in a scale from 1 (irrelevant) to 5 (fundamental) 
 
Recourse to the 
institution  
Degree of effectiveness 
ICE (Italian institute for foreign commerce) ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Italian Embassy ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Chamber of Commerce ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Italian banks ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Italy-China Foundation ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Other (please specify)       ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Which of the following activities is the company currently conducting in China?  
 Activities in China 
We produce final products/services and sell them in China ☐ 
We produce final products/services and sell them in investor’s market ☐ 
We produce final products/services  and sell them in third countries (no China and Investor’s) ☐ 
We produce components or parts of the product that are exported in other market to be completed ☐ 
We buy raw materials and components for the end-product, which is produced in Investor’s market ☐ 
We sell products/services produced in Investor’s market ☐ 
We sell products/services  produced in other countries (no China and Investor’s) ☐ 
Other (please specify)       ☐ 
Please assess the reasons for your presence in China on a scale from 1 (irrelevant) to 5 (fundamental) 
now and the reasons why you first invested in the market.  
 
Nowadays When you first invested with an 
FDI 
Low labor cost 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Availability of cheap raw materialis  1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Availability of skilled labour force 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Availability of R&D capabilities 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Logistic advantages 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Fiscal advantages 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Development of a “new” end market 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Competitors are in the market 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Lower constraints as concerns environment laws 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Lower constraints as concern work force rights 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Other (please specify)       1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
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What are your priorities for investments in China now? What were when you first invested in the country? 
You can mark more than one. Please indicate the priority with numbers (with 1 standing for top priority) 
 Nowadays First investment 
Increase production capacity ☐       ☐       
Market research ☐       ☐       
Increase/improve local supply chain (localization) ☐       ☐       
R&D ☐       ☐       
Search/retain skilled labor force ☐       ☐       
Search for new client/distributors  ☐       ☐       
Other (please specify)       ☐       ☐       
No investment ☐       ☐       
Which of the followings, based on your personal experience, do you think are the most relevant issues 
when doing business in China? Which were before?Please rate them in a scale from 1(irrelevant) to 5 
(critical)  
 
Nowadays When you first entered  
Intellectual Property Right Infringement 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Chinese protectionism 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Geographical distance 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Language differences 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Cultural differences 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Discrimination against foreign brands/companies 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Bureaucracy and Licensing requirements 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Unclear regulations 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Corruption 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Difficulties in finding suitable local partners 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Work force not qualified 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Management-level human resources constraints 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Non Management-level human resources constraints 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Other (please specify)       1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Please mark how useful your company considers the following strategies to overcome the major issues 
faced. Is the efficacy changed compared to the beginning? Please rate them in a scale from 1 (not useful 
at all) to 5 (fundamental). In case the strategy has never been used, do not mark any level. 
 
Nowadays When you first entered  
Product differentiation (strong brand) 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Import know-how/technologies from the parent company 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Create a local network of contacts (“Guanxi”) 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Contract protection  1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Preliminary market studies/resesearches 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Hire managers with experience in China or Asia 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Strict investor control 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Expatriate management in loco 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Local Management in loco 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Use of parent company organizational practices 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Copy local competitors behavior 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Other (please specify)       1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 
Do you think, overall, that the company has improved in overcoming issues related to its foreignness 
over time?  
Got worse ☐ No changes ☐ Small improvements ☐ Substantial improvements ☐ 
 
 
